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Judges and commentators have never come to grips with the notion that
courts, legislatures, and administrative bodies interact. In the area of torts,
for example, the academic community has carefully analyzed the effect of
liability doctrines on private accident prevention and avoidance. Yet few
scholars have focused on the ways judge-made rules influence the political
actions of litigants and public regulators. Scholars have, in other words,
largely ignored the status of the parties as members of coalitions or inter-
est groups lobbying legislatures and administrative agencies.'
By imposing liability on politically influential tort defendants, courts
may indirectly prompt legislatures and agencies to consider the underlying
cause of a class of cases. The resulting regulation may, in turn, obviate the
need for a liability rule. In this Article, I propose that courts should de-
cide limited categories of negligence cases with a view to the possibility of
a "political" response.2
To demonstrate my premise, I focus on negligent security litigation.
The term "negligent security" refers to cases in which injured crime vic-
tims sue commercial enterprises upon or near whose property the crimes
occurred. The victims allege that the enterprises should have taken ad-
vance measures-such as improving lighting, hiring guards, or at least
issuing warnings-that might have prevented the harm.' Until recently,
courts precluded negligent security liability based on a general notion that
private parties have no duty to protect unrelated persons from criminal
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1. My view that courts should react to the fact that they are but one of many governmental
agencies capable of acting on a given problem is not radical. Others have urged courts to acknowledge
the interplay among the various decision-makers. See J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A
STRATEGY FOR OrrIzEN AcTION xviii, 233-39 (1971); Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between
Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law
of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 521, 577 (1982).
2. I use the term "political" to refer to the reaction of the legislative and executive branches of
government to judicial decisions and lobbying by the branches' constituents. I do not mean to address
the separate question which use of the term might raise, that is, whether the actions of the judiciary
itself should be considered "political" in a broader sense. See, e.g., D. KAiRYS, THE POLITICS OF
LAW 1-6 (1982) (rejecting idealized model of law that depicts courts as separate from, and above,
politics).
3. See generally Suits Charging Lax Security Are Increasing, Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 1983, at 33,
col. 3. A number of actual and hypothetical examples are considered in detail infra text accompanying
notes 242-76.
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attack.4 A growing number of modern judges have, however, allowed cases
to proceed. They have extended standard tort rules to hold libraries,5 su-
permarkets,8  restaurants,7  schools, 8 laundromats,9  commuter train sta-
tions, 0 and summer camps accountable for crime-related injuries. 2
In Part I of this Article, I analyze the peculiar development of negligent
security litigation by focusing upon the seminal case, Kline v. 1500 Mas-
sachusetts Avenue Apartment Corporation.3 Despite Kline's apparent
novelty, its result is consistent with both substantive tort law policies and
the broader historical trend toward liberalized liability. I thus conclude
that judges have resisted liability in the negligent security context largely
because of "process" concerns. 4 I argue that it is precisely where process
and substantive tort policies compete that courts should consider the bene-
ficial political effects of a liability rule.1 5
In Part II, I use historical examples to identify a model of "political
4. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 314-15 (1934); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314
(1966).
5. See Abbott v. New York Pub. Library, 263 A.D. 314, 319, 32 N.Y.S.2d 963, 968 (1942).
6. Atamian v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 146 N.J. Super. 149, 157-58, 369 A.2d 38, 42-43
(1976).
7. Eastep v. Jack-in-the-Box, Inc., 546 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
8. McLeod v. Grant County School Dist. No. 128, 42 Wash. 2d 316, 321-22, 255 P.2d 360, 363
(1953) (en banc).
9. Morris v. Barnette, 553 S.W.2d 648, 649-50 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (denying defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment).
10. Neering v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 383 Ill. 366, 374, 50 N.E.2d 497, 501 (1943) (disavowing any
reliance on "common carrier" rule).
11. Wallace v. Der-Ohanian, 199 Cal. App. 2d 141, 147-48, 18 Cal. Rptr. 892, 896-97 (1962)
(evidence sufficient to support finding of liability).
12. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965) acknowledges the changing trend.
While casting negligent security liability in terms of the duty of possessors of land to invitees, it in
essence supports broad liability of commercial enterprises.
If the place or character of his business, or his past experience, is such that he should reasona-
bly anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or at
some particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against it ....
Id. § 344 comment f.
13. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Kline and its progeny are discussed in detail in Haines,
Landlords or Tenants: Who Bears the Costs of Crime?, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 299 (1981); Henszey &
Weisman, What Is the Landlord's Responsibility for Criminal Acts Committed on the Premises?, 6
REAL EsT. L.J. 104 (1977); Selvin, Landlord Tort Liability for Criminal Attacks on Tenants: De-
velopments Since Kline, 9 REAL EsT. L.J. 311 (1981); Note, Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants
from Criminal Acts of Third Parties: The View From 1500 Massachusetts Avenue, 59 GEo. L.J.
1153 (1971); Comment, The Landlord's Emerging Responsibility for Tenant Security, 71 COLuM. L.
REV. 275 (1971).
14. Process concerns reflect an anxiety over the costs and volume of tort litigation, as well as the
lack of competence of judges and juries to resolve complex issues that depend on multiple interdepen-
dent factors. These concerns are often used to justify an immunity rule. See infra note 80.
15. Courts and commentators who reject process as a valid judicial concern will have no use for
this Article's "political effects model." Political effects, like process costs, are practical results of liabil-
ity rules. Because the two sets of considerations are similar in nature and importance, the model
suggests that courts should consider neither or both. See infra text accompanying notes 191-95. I do
not offer the model as an independent, substantive justification for imposing liability in the absence of
countervailing process reasoning.
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effects." I conclude that these effects may, within limits, offset process
concerns and support tort liability that is otherwise sound. Part III illus-
trates how the "political effects" model would work in practice. It returns
to the negligent security context and discusses why the political effects
model comes into play. I then apply the model to specific examples of
negligent security litigation to show how courts can implement political
considerations on a narrow, category-by-category basis.
I. NEGLIGENT SECURITY LIABILITY AND PROCESS CONCERNS
The history of negligent security litigation is schizophrenic. During the
early development of general negligence doctrine,"6 courts distinguished
the obligation to prevent third-party harm from the duty of reasonable
care: "The fact that [an] actor realizes or should realize that action on his
part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose
upon him a duty to take such action."1 7 Nevertheless, several lines of cases
offered a legal basis for negligent security liability. For example, the com-
mon law required landowners to take precautions against foreseeable
harm to persons invited onto their property.1" Similarly, innkeepers19 and
16. The prevailing view of legal historians is that as American industry began to develop, it
needed protection against tort litigation to survive. Courts apparently believed industry could not af-
ford to internalize and pay liability costs. Negligence principles therefore began to temper existing
strict liability rules. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 12.3, at 749-52 (1956);
M. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 90-91 (1977); Gregory,
Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 377-78, 382-83 (1951); cf. W.
KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 28, at
161 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PRossER & KEETON] (the "rise [of negligence] coincided in a
marked degree with the Industrial Revolution"). Courts-undoubtedly motivated by process consider-
ations-soon developed further "immunities" to liability, which they applied primarily in favor of
corporate defendants. See M. HORwITz, supra, at 94-108, 204-06; L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 409-10, 416-17 (1973); Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History
of the Common Law of Torts, 31 LA. L. REv. 1, 40-41 (1970). But see Schwartz, Tort Law and the
Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YAI L.J. 1717, 1723, 1772-75
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz, Tort Law] (questioning conclusion that strict liability controlled
18th century tort law and that pro-industry biases motivated subsequent changes); Schwartz, The
Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REv. 963, 964-70 (1981) [herein-
after cited as Schwartz, Vitality of Negligence] (same).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965); see RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 314
(1934). Courts and commentators fought off changes to the general no-duty principle even in the most
compelling of circumstances. Rather than apply the logic of the broad negligence standard of care or
adopt a separate flexible rule for harm caused by third parties, the courts created narrow exceptions
to the general no-duty rule. The courts thus confined any duty to take affirmative action to protect
others to limited situations where a "special relationship" exists between the actor and the person
threatened with harm. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 314-20 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 314, 314A, 314B, 316-21 (1965); see also Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 756,
760-62, 467 N.E.2d 1292, 1300, 1302-03 (1984) (citing cases).
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(3) (1965).
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A(2) & 314A app. (1966) (citing cases). It is
incorrect to presume that negligent security cases deal with the same type of criminal conspiracy as
the innkeeper-guest theory. See Note, Expanding the Scope of the Implied Warranty of Habitability:
A Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants from Foreseeable Criminal Activity, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1493,
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other business proprietors20 had special obligations to their patrons.
Judges, however, declined to apply these theories in the crime-prevention
context.21 Even with the dramatic twentieth century expansion of tort lia-
bility,22 negligent security litigation lagged behind.2" Although Kline has
now made the initial breakthrough and other recent courts have endorsed
liability,2" many judges continue to resist the use of tort law to encourage
crime prevention.25
1503 (1980); Note, supra note 13, at 1167. To the extent innkeeper rules were concerned with crime,
they addressed the situation in which innkeepers conspired with thieves to rob travelers and then split
the booty. The rules provided a form of strict liability to end these practices.
20. See, e.g., Bender v. Nalee, Inc., 261 Md. 82, 274 A.2d 85 (1971); Genovay v. Fox, 50 N.J.
Super. 538, 549, 143 A.2d 229, 234-35 (App. Div. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 29 N.J. 436, 149
A.2d 212 (1959). The reporters of the RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs, however, declined to consider the
business-patron relationship as one that warranted extended liability.
21. Courts analyzed and misanalyzed negligent security litigation in a variety of ways. Some mis-
takenly treated it as a subset of bystander rescue cases, in which a general "no duty to rescue" rule
applies. See infra text accompanying notes 61-66.
Other courts attempted to force negligent security cases into exceptions to the general duty of
care-for example, the traditionally limited liability owed by landowners to trespassers. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 333-39 (1965). These exceptions do not comfortably fit the negligent
security context. The limitations on landowner liability, in particular, make little sense where a de-
fendant has encouraged a victim to frequent his premises.
22. See, L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 420, 423-25; Schwartz, Vitality of Negligence, supra
note 16, at 964-67.
23. Judges persisted in absolving enterprises from accountability by holding that injury-producing
crimes were unforeseeable and a superceding cause of victims' injuries. See, e.g., Cornpropst v. Sloan,
528 S.W.2d 188, 198 (Tenn. 1975); Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 157-58, 207 S.E.2d
841, 844-45 (1974).
24. Honest observers acknowledged Kline as an attempt to restructure established tort concepts to
deal with the modern crime problem and to impose responsibility upon private parties in a position to
take preventive measures. See Doyle v. Exxon Corp., 592 F.2d 44, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1979); Braitman v.
Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 374-88, 346 A.2d 76, 79-87 (1975); cf. Scott v. Watson, 278
Md. 160, 167-69, 359 A.2d 548, 553-54 (1976) (rejecting Kline as imposing liability in too narrow a
context and basing liability on more general theory). See generally sources cited supra note 13.
25. Kline provoked a storm of criticism. Some judges rejected its rationale outright. See, e.g., Trice
v. Chicago Housing Auth., 14 Ill. App. 3d 97, 100-01, 302 N.E.2d 207, 210 (1973); McCappin v.
Park Capitol Corp., 42 N.J. Super. 169, 173, 126 A.2d 51, 53 (App. Div. 1956). Others distinguished
Kline as a natural outgrowth of the special obligations of innkeepers. See, e.g., O'Hara v. Western
Seven Trees Corp. Intercoast Management, 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 802, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487, 489
(1977); Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 407, 224 N.W.2d 843, 849
(1975). This approach ignored the fact that the innkeeper rules had never been so applied. Still others
tried to explain the decision as a slight expansion of landlords' obligations to warrant habitability, see,
e.g., Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 228, 412 A.2d 436, 443 (1980); Brownstein v. Edison, 103
Misc. 2d 316, 318, 425 N.Y.S.2d 773, 774-75 (Sup. Ct. 1980), or as a contract case resting upon
implicit representations made by the specific defendant landlord to Ms. Kline, see, e.g., O'Hara v.
Seven Trees Corp. Intercoast Management, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 803, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 490. See
generally Haines, supra note 13, at 304, 327, 354-55 n.195; Henszey & Weisman, supra note 13, at
106-07, 111-12, 116-18; Selvin, supra note 13, at 314. One commentator sharply criticized the Kline
court for mentioning a contract theory at all, and thus giving rise to the possibility of confusion. Note,
Landlord-Tenant Relations, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 943, 952-53 (1970).
After Kline, various legislatures also expressed dissatisfaction with the no-duty to prevent crime
rule. See PROSSER & KEErON, supra note 16, § 56, at 375 n.21 (Vermont, Minnesota, Rhode Island
statutes impose limited obligations upon private citizens to act to protect safety of others); see also
State v. Joyce, 139 Vt. 638, 641, 433 A.2d 271, 273 (1981) (Vermont's criminal statute creates duty
to intervene in some circumstances). The New Jersey legislature passed a housing regulation requir-
ing landlords to provide certain protective equipment necessary to the "health, safety and welfare of
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There are three possible explanations for this reluctance. First, from a
functional or instrumental perspective, 26 negligent security liability might
appear to skew resource allocation. Second, from a corrective justice
standpoint,27 judges may think it unfair to force private parties to take
measures against crimes which, in a sense, the parties neither initiate nor
control. Third, some courts may fear that authorizing negligent security
litigation will embroil them in a morass of undefined and unfocused liti-
gation; process considerations may justify shutting the door to litigation at
the pleading stage in the face of other fairness concerns. In the following
Sections, I analyze Kline as a means for considering these three possible
justifications for precluding negligent security lawsuits.
A. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corporation
Sarah Kline lived in a fashionable Washington, D.C. apartment house
in which a growing number of violent crimes had taken place. Ms. Kline
was assaulted, robbed, and seriously injured in a public hallway of the
building." She sued her landlord for failing to take reasonable measures
to prevent the increasing criminal activity upon the premises. The land-
lord argued that its traditional duty extended only to reasonable mainte-
nance of the building.
The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the
district court's judgment for the defendant. According to the Kline major-
the occupants." 55 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13A-7 (West Supp. 1985). In response, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court reconsidered its rejection of Kline-type liability. Trentacost v. Brussell, 82 N.J. 214,
228-230, 412 A.2d 436, 443 (1980).
26. "The functional approach has come to dominate American tort scholarship." Calabresi, Con-
cerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 69, 70
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Calabresi, Concerning Cause]. The leading proponent of a pure function-
alist approach to negligence is Richard Posner. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(2d ed. 1977); Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEx. L. REV. 757 (1975); Posner, A
Theory of Negligence, I J. LEG. STUD. 29 (1972). The more radical economic analysis of Professor
Calabresi supports some form of strict liability, rather than traditional negligence. See, e.g., G. CAIA-
BREsi, THE Cosr OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE
L.J. 656 (1975).
27. Different normative approaches emphasize different moral precepts. The early views of Aus-
tin and Holmes focused on individual freedom and the abstract notion of "fault." See, e.g., I J.
AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 407-16 (5th ed. 1911); O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
77-110 (1881). Professor James developed a more comprehensive emphasis on social or distributive
justice. See, e.g., James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE
L.J. 549 (1948). Tort's modem philosophers explain negligence theory in terms that focus on "indi-
vidual responsibility," "reciprocal obligations" of members of society, and, more generally, corrective
justice between the parties. See, e.g., Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 151
(1973); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1972); see also,
Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HoFSTRA L. REv. 509, 526-40 (1980)
(noting argument that efficient resource allocation is itself moral and that rule furthering efficiency is
thus justified on normative basis). See generally Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE
L.J. 247 (1980).
28. As in most negligent security cases, Ms. Kline's assailant escaped and therefore could not be
sued.
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ity, the general rule that a private person has no duty to protect another
from criminal attack by a third person29 falters when "applied to the con-
ditions of modern day urban apartment living."3 0 The court rested its de-
cision upon the landlord's awareness of the burgeoning crime problem and
the fact that the landlord was in the best position to take preventive
measures:
[Wihere, as here, the landlord has notice of repeated criminal as-
saults and robberies, has notice that these crimes occurred in the por-
tion of the premises exclusively within his control, has every reason
to expect like crimes to happen again, and has the exclusive power to
take preventive action, it does not seem unfair to place upon the
landlord a duty to take those steps which are within his power to
minimize the predictable risk to his tenants.3"
The court reviewed the facts in the record, concluded that the 1500 Mas-
sachusetts Avenue Corporation had breached its duty of "reasonable care
in all the circumstances," ' 2  and remanded for a determination of
damages.33
B. The Substantive Bases for Negligent Security Liability
1. Landlord Liability under the Functional View
Instrumentalists approach tort law as a mechanism for allocating soci-
ety's accident-prevention resources. In the Kline context, instrumentalists
would ask what steps the 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Corporation and
other landlords will take after a decision authorizing negligence litigation.
How will potential plaintiffs react? Under the functional view, tort liabil-
29. 439 F.2d at 481.
30. Id.; see id. at 483-85.
31. Id. at 481. The Court of Appeals explained its rationale in more detail:
No individual tenant had it within his power to take measures to guard the garage en-
tranceways, to provide scrutiny at the main entrance of the building, to patrol the common
hallways and elevators, to set up any kind of a security alarm system in the building, to
provide additional locking devices on the main doors, to provide a system of announcement for
authorized visitors only, to close the garage doors at appropriate hours, and to see that the
entrance was manned at all times. . . . [M]inimization [of the risk of criminal assault] was
almost entirely within the power of the landlord ....
Id. at 480.
32. Id. at 485.
33. Kline left many questions unresolved. Although the court found liability, it reached the some-
what contradictory conclusion that a landlord is not an "insurer of the safety of his tenants" and owes
no duty equivalent to police protection. Id. at 487. The court also failed to consider how Kline would
apply where the cost of crime-prevention passed along to tenants is greater than the price the tenant is
willing to pay. Id. at 488. Yet however murky some aspects of Kline may be, the case unambiguously
modified the traditional no-duty to prevent crime rule-at least in the limited landord-tenant
area-to take modern problems and realities into account. See generally sources cited supra note 13.
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ity is appropriate only where unregulated markets fail to induce behavior
that produces the optimal level of spending on safety. 4
Negligent security liability encourages landlords to spend funds on basic
security devices, including locks, burglar alarms and guards. We cannot
predict or quantify how much this will affect the level of criminal activ-
ity.3 5 The new security precautions are likely to deter some criminals from
committing further crimes, while causing others simply to transfer their
activities to other neighborhoods."
As a higher level of security becomes the norm, common perceptions of
how much security is "reasonable" will adjust. This in turn will provoke
a cycle of more precautionary measures.3 7 Further expenditures may re-
flect "overspending" on security, but will continue to reduce crime in the
neighborhoods.
A liability rule may also have secondary risk-distributive effects. Com-
mercial defendants are likely to invest to some extent in liability insur-
ance. They may, instead, choose to self-insure, by creating a "reserve
fund" to cover future negligent security liability judgments. To the extent
they can, they will pass along the premium or reserve fund costs to the
beneficiaries of the insurance-in the Kline setting, the tenants. 8 The lia-
bility rule thus spreads the cost of crime, pro rata, among the potential
victims.39
34. See Calabresi, Concerning Cause, supra note 26, at 84; Calabresi & Malamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,
1096-97 (1972).
35. Unless we adopt the unsupported assumption that crime will remain at a constant level no
matter what steps society takes, it is logical to expect that the likelihood of success will be an impor-
tant determinant of the crime level. See, e.g., W. LUESETICH & M. WHITE, CRIME AND PUBLIC
POLICY: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 71-80, 117-22 (1982).
36. Empirical evidence measuring the magnitude of the "transfer effect" does not exist. We can
even hypothesize a scenario in which reducing the level but shifting the location of crime might prove
undesireable. If crime moves to an unpopulated, poorly lit residential area, the less frequent violence
that occurs may nonetheless be more serious in character. This scenario, however, probably underesti-
mates the likely net effect of deterrence in commercial sectors.
37. For an excellent article on the means by which the law encourages citizens to increase the
level of private expenditures for safety, see Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and
Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281 (1980).
38. A landlord that takes crime-preventive measures in response to negligent security liability will
also charge tenants. See Kline, 459 F.2d at 488 (landlord justified in passing on cost). The landlord
may, however, bear a portion of the cost itself so as not to raise prices to a prohibitive level. See
Clotfelter & Seeley, The Private Costs of Crime, in THE COsTS OF CRIME 213, 219 (C. Gray ed.
1979).
39. See Pierce, supra note 37, at 1285, 1288-89 (tort regulation responds to inability of individu-
als to participate in negotiations concerning risk). Risk-spreading avoids catastrophic losses that have
emotional and economic impact beyond the cost of the injury itself. See, e.g., 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, supra note 16, at 763 n.7. See generally Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 563
(1980). As a justification for tort liability, however, the benefits of risk distribution support a strict
liability rather than a negligence approach. See, James, supra note 27, at 550 (strict liability creates
system of social insurance for accidents); Sandier, Strict Liability and the Need for Legislation, 53
VA. L. REV. 1509, 1512 (1967) (same). The goals of negligence suggest that society has no abstract
interest in compensating the victim at the expense of the defendant. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra
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These distributive effects of a liability rule are not all positive. The
additional expenses may drive marginally profitable enterprises out of
business. Tenants, particularly poor tenants, may not be willing or able to
pay the increased cost.40 More significant from a resource allocation per-
spective is the fact that liability insurance costs and benefits tend to exceed
those of victim compensation insurance.41 The Kline rule, in effect, en-
courages landlords to impose on tenants a higher compensation package,
at a higher cost, than the customers as a whole would choose to
purchase.42
On the surface, it therefore appears that negligent security liability
skews resource allocation. The tenants and landlords can bargain directly
over rent and security. In theory, bargaining results in a more tailored
investment in crime prevention than tort law achieves by forcing landlords
to adopt "reasonable" measures. Unless landlords undertake the economi-
cally "correct" level of security, the level tenants are willing to pay for,'43
the tenants can refuse to rent.
The bargaining model, however, presupposes two critical elements that
do not exist in the Kline context: equal information on the part of tenants
and landlords, and equal ability to act effectively on that information
through bargaining and selection of alternatives. 4 4 Building managers are
note 16, at 752-58; see Calabresi, Concerning Cause, supra note 26, at 73; Owen, Rethinking the
Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681, 703-07, 715 (1980).
40. Historically, the poor reside and transact business in dangerous areas of cities and are likely to
require a greater degree of crime protection. See Henszey & Weisman, supra note 13, at 121. Simul-
taneously, the poor are less able to afford pass-along costs. See Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J.
578, 591, 186 A.2d 291, 297-98 (1962); see also Note, supra note 13, at 1189, 1196-97. Requiring
additional security may drive landlords of low income housing operating at a marginal profit out of
business. Negligent security liability thus to some extent takes from poor consumers the freedom of
choice to bear the risk of crime in exchange for obtaining goods and services at a lower price. See
Comment, supra note 13, at 294-301; cf. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 205,
210-11 (1973) (strict liability may fail to accommodate risk-preferring consumers).
Liability, however, merely shifts the true costs of crime from one fortuitously selected as a victim to
a broader class of potential victims. Arguably, if internalization of the actual costs of crime prevents
an enterprise from operating profitably, it is properly driven out of business. Moreover, pass-along
costs of "reasonable" precautions will not necessarily be high. See, e.g., Haines, supra note 13, at 351
("reasonable" security measures in Kline might well have entailed no more than installing new locks).
As an empirical matter, the Kline decision has not had the "dire social consequences" that economists
and commentators predicted. Selvin, supra note 13, at 318. In the long run, imposition of tort liability
may even decrease victims' overall costs by, inter alia, reducing the level of crime.
41. Insurance premiums depend in large measure on the size of tort recoveries and the heavy
administrative costs associated with litigation. Recoveries typically include sums for pain and suffer-
ing, psychological harm, and attorneys' fees that far exceed the losses for which customers would
voluntarily insure themselves.
42. Enforced victim compensation insurance to some extent requires poor tenants to subsidize the
rich. Wealthier crime victims tend to lose more valuable possessions and suffer greater loss of earn-
ings. Yet each tenant pays an equal premium, set according to the average loss of potential victims.
43. See Posner, supra note 40, at 210-211 (1973).
44. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 34, at 1094-95; Pierce, supra note 37, at 1284-85(economic analysis presumes full information); Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Pro-
tection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109,
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 95: 698, 1986
better informed than tenants about the nature of crime near their build-
ings and the available security measures.4 5 Tenants may not even under-
stand the information regarding crime that they do have."' Competing lo-
cal landlords have an incentive not to publicize or explain the
dangerousness of a particular building; publicity highlights the general
security problem in the neighborhood 47 and drives potential customers
elsewhere." On the whole, individual landlords are therefore more able
than tenants to obtain and process information and to compare the real
costs and benefits of improving security.
Landlords are also in a better position to act on available information.49
Because they know tenants have limited alternatives, landlords often re-
fuse to negotiate over specific safety measures with individuals. Unless the
tenant can find a way to organize other potential victims and collectively
bargain, 5° he cannot force a given landlord to decrease the risk of crime in
exchange for a higher rent.51
Of course, in the housing example, a safety conscious tenant might ex-
press his preference by moving to a more secure, higher-rent building.
52
Safer but otherwise comparable housing may, however, not be available in
the neighborhood. The hesitation of area landlords to draw attention to
crime will have caused them to adjust their marketing practices. The
landlords may only be able to advertise building safety profitably by
1375 (1974) (resource allocation theory "posits that individuals acting with information adequate to
their choice may select for themselves the risks they wish to bear").
45. Attaining optimal resource allocation through a market approach "depends in large part on
the quality of consumer information." Shapo, supra note 44, at 1371. Sarah Kline, as a security-
conscious tenant, may have been aware that a problem existed. She was, however, unlikely to know
details of, for example, how often crimes occurred in the building, where, what time of day, and what
type of crime. The landlord, as the facts in Kline showed, was fully informed. 439 F.2d at 479.
46. Studies of residents of high crime areas show that they generally believe their own neighbor-
hoods to be as safe or safer than the average community, regardless of the actual facts. See CRIME IN
A FREE SOCIETY 17-18 (R. Winslow ed. 1968).
47. See Posner, supra note 40, at 211 (advertisement of safety improvement implies that product
is hazardous).
48. If, however, relatively safe competing neighborhoods exist, landlords from those areas should,
in theory, publicize the danger.
49. Even if a particular group of tenants has accurate information concerning neighborhood
crime, for the market to work the tenants must still have "the ability to form rational judgments based
upon those facts." Pierce, supra note 37, at 1285. As Professor Pierce notes, "[pisychological studies
uniformly demonstrate that individuals have a limited ability to make rational decisions concerning
health and safety risks even when they have full knowledge of the nature of the risks." Id. at 1286; see
also G. CALABRESI, supra note 26, at 56.
50. An individual tenant, such as Sarah Kline, may volunteer to pay a pro rata share of the costs.
She will, however, have no avenue to solicit similar contributions from other tenants. See Selvin,
supra note 13, at 314-15 (cost of collective action by tenants is prohibitively high). Even if Ms. Kline
were able to pay the full cost, it would not be fair to force her to carry the burden of other "free
rider" tenants.
51. Kline, 439 F.2d at 480, 488.
52. See, e.g., id. at 492-93 (MacKinnon J., dissenting); Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68
N.J. 368, 387, 346 A.2d 76, 86 (1975); Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 578-88, 186 A.2d
291, 296 (1962).
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"packaging" security precautions as one aspect of a luxury establish-
ment. 3 Higher rent, luxury buildings ordinarily charge for frills, such as
swimming pools, for which the tenant may not want or be able to pay.54
Unless at least one landlord breaks rank and openly solicits safety-
conscious tenants, existing markets will provide little opportunity for bar-
gaining on the security issue alone.
For all of these reasons, the landlord-tenant "market" fails to produce
incentives for commercial enterprises to undertake society's optimal level
of security precautions. A functional approach thus justifies judicial inter-
vention. By imposing negligent security liability on landlords, the Kline
court placed the burden on central actors with better information and the
ability to assess and implement the information. The court could not ex-
pect liability to lead to the same economic optimality as "perfect bargain-
ing." The ultimate result of liability, however, was more likely to be ra-
tional than that of a no-liability rule in an imperfect market.5
2. Landlord Liability Under the Normative View
For many scholars and courts the notion of "fault" is the theoretical
foundation of negligence law.56 Principles of corrective justice justify shift-
ing the costs of an accident to the defendant only where the defendant acts
in a "blameworthy fashion."'57
At a superficial level, the landlord in Kline seems innocent.58 The 1500
Massachusetts Avenue Corporation did not bring about the crime that in-
jured Sarah Kline.59 It could not foresee that a criminal would engage in
unlawful conduct at a time when Ms. Kline would get in the criminal's
way. If the government, with its vast law enforcement resources, could not
53. Under current marketing practices, economists disagree on whether crime affects the demand
for housing at all. Compare Kain & Quigley, Measuring the Value of Housing Quality, 30 J. AM.
STAT. ASS'N 532-48 (1970) with Gray & Joelson, Neighborhood Crime and the Demand for Central
City Housing, in THE COSTS OF CRIME, supra note 38, at 47.
54. See Note, supra note 13, at 1171.
55. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 34, at 1096-97 (cost of failing to take disputed safety
measure should fall on party in best position to make cost-benefit analysis and most cheaply avoid, or
induce avoidance of, costs).
56. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 27, at 152-60; Fletcher, supra note 27, at 537-40; Henderson,
Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 903 (1982).
57. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 16, at 753. See generally Coleman, Moral Theories of
Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part II, 2 LAW & PHIL. 5, 6-14 (1983).
58. See, Kline, 439 F.2d at 481. Imposing liability on the landlord seems particularly worrisome
because a jury may transfer its hostility from the criminal (who has escaped and is not in the court-
room) to the deep-pocket defendant. See Fager, Liability of Business Proprietors for Criminal Acts of
Third Persons, 29 FED. INS. COUNS. Q., 29, 33 (1978); Haines, supra note 13, at 352 (citing
authorities).
59. Cf. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 16, at 751 (courts hesitate to impose liability for
accident that defendant "had no part in bringing about").
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prevent the injury, it hardly seems fair to attribute moral responsibility to
the relatively uninvolved commercial defendant.60
Yet the landlord can hardly be equated with an innocent bystander."
1
The landlord is "blameworthy. '6 2 It encourages tenants like Sarah Kline
to live in a crime-ridden area and expose themselves to injury. A negli-
gence verdict reflects a finding that the landlord's omission of security is
unreasonable and has contributed to the victim's injury." Thus, if the
landlord is comparable to the bystander at all, the best analogy is to the
citizen who induces a victim to take a risk-the one type of bystander the
common law has traditionally held accountable." The landlord may be
relatively less culpable than the assailant, but that consideration bears
60. Some commentators suggest that the trend towards negligent security liability merely high-
lights the government's inefficiency in performing its own crime-prevention functions, an inefficiency
which does not "justify transferring. . . responsibility to business proprietors." Fager, supra note 58,
at 33. In recent years, courts have begun to impose liability on municipalities for the negligent failure
of the police to prevent crime. See, e.g., Huhn v. Dixie Ins. Co., 453 So. 2d 70 (Fla. App. 1984);
Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984). But see Note, Police Liability for
Negligent Failure to Prevent Crime, 94 HARV. L. Rav. 821, 822 (1981) (prevailing view remains no
liability). See generally the three opinions in Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash.2d 275,
669 P.2d 451 (1983).
61. Courts have generally rejected bystander liability in favor of a "no-duty to rescue" rule. See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 314 (1934). Whatever the merits of this rule, neither its underlying
philosophical concern for the bystander's autonomy nor its emphasis on the bystander's personal
safety are relevant to the negligent security defendant. Judges need not concern themselves with such
typical "good samaritan" issues as (1) how much danger the bystander must risk if he is required to
interfere, see, e.g., Edgar, The Bystander's Duty and the Law of Torts-An Alternative Proposal, 8
ST. MARY'S L.J. 302, 303 (1976); (2) is it excusable for him to "freeze" and thereby not act even if
he could do so without risk, see, e.g., Edgar, supra, at 308; Note, Forcing the Bystander to Get
Involved: A Case for a Statute Requiring Witnesses to Report Crime, 94 YALE L.J. 1787, 1789-90
(1985); and (3) should rational or irrational fear of future retaliation by the criminal be an acceptable
defense, see, e.g., Gregory, The Good Samaritan and the Bad: The Anglo-American Law, in THE
GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 23, 34-35 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as RATCLIFFE];
Freedman, No Response to the Cry for Help, in RATCLIFFE, supra, at 171, 176. Negligent security
defendants are expected to act before any crime occurs, so they have no need or reason to undertake
any risk, to freeze, or to feel fear. Commercial enterprises are, in any event, not entitled to the same
degree of privacy and freedom from regulation as are individuals. See, e.g., United States v. Morton
Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
62. In assessing negligent security defendants' "blameworthiness," it is important to recall that
negligence is an objective concept. The "fault" that historically justifies tort liability focuses on
whether the defendant acted reasonably, not whether he tried or wanted to injure the plaintiff. See
Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part 1, 1 LAW & PHIL. 371, 375 (1983).
63. Traditional tort theory often distinguished between acts and omissions that caused harm. But
the many exceptions to the general rule, see supra note 17, illustrate that practical rather than norma-
tive justifications underlie this distinction. See Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REv. 97, 112-13
(1908); Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53
VA. L. REv. 774, 781-83 (1967); see also Weinrib, supra note 27, at 251-58 (discussing feasance/
non-feasance distinction); cf. Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE
L.J. 886, 886 (1934) (most "facts can be compressed to come within the concept of non-feasance or
expanded to fit the mould of misfeasance").
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
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more on issues of comparative negligence and the extent of damages 5
than on the question of fault itself.6
The traditional liability of "innkeepers," "landowners" and "business
invitors' '6 7 illustrates why commercial enterprises that solicit customers
cannot be considered "blameless" for injuries. By inviting customers in
order to secure financial gain, an enterprise fosters crime. It provides a
pool of victims and booty in a convenient location for potential wrongdo-
ers. The enterprise is also in a position to take advance measures to avoid
the danger.68 The early cases thus underscore the enterprise's correspond-
ing moral obligation to give back, in the form of accident prevention, some
of what it takes from customers in the form of risk exposure.69 The gov-
ernment's general responsibility for law enforcement does not eliminate
the business's separate duty to supplement public compensation and pub-
lic protection.7 0
65. As in other areas of the law, juries are fully capable of adjusting liability to fit a defendant'sguilt. See, for example, Atamian v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 146 N.J. Super. 149, 369 A.2d 38, 44(1976), in which the court left these matters to the jury's discretion. See generally Franklin, supra
note 63, at 790-93 (discussing methods by which juries adjust verdicts). Where verdicts are high, theplaintiffs' suffering will have been commensurate. See Bass v. City of New York, 38 A.D. 407, 417,330 N.Y.S.2d 569, 579 (1972) (economic burden of crime-prevention "is of far less significance than
the sufferings of the victim exposed to inadequate protection").
66. Negligent security liability can be explained and supported by the work of some of tort law's
modern philosophers as well. See supra note 27. In Professor Fletcher's terms, for example, enter-prises that make their premises attractive to criminals have imposed a "non-reciprocal" risk upon
customers and bystanders. The injuries they cause may thus only be justified by an adequate "excuse"
grounded in social utility. See Fletcher, supra note 27, at 543-56.In Professor Epstein's view, however, the normative key to liability is whether the defendant di-
rectly caused plaintiff's injury. Epstein's emphasis on individual freedom of action renders it unlikelythat he would accept an enterprise's failure to act as a substitute for causation. See Epstein, supra
note 27, at 166. Epstein's strict and somewhat artificial reliance on limited causation notions to define
"moral responsibility" has, however, come under severe critical attack. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note62, at 380-81 (1983); Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American TortTheory, 9 J. LEG. STUDS. 27, 59-61 (1980); Schwartz, Vitality of Negligence, supra note 16, at 990,
994, 997.
67. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
68. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442B (1965) ("Where the negligent conduct...
increases the risk of a particular harm ...the fact that the harm is brought about through theintervention of another force does not [necessarily] relieve the actor of liability . . ).69. The principle of corrective justice that underlies much of tort law "requires the annulment of
...wrongful gains" and accomplishes that annulment through the injured plaintiff. Coleman, supra
note 57, at 6-7. A defendant secures a wrongful benefit when, like the negligent security defendant,
he undertakes an activity without paying the costs associated with it. Id. at 10.70. As a practical matter, law enforcement expenditures have not been able to keep pace with theincrease in crime. See infra notes 198 & 203; cf. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An EconomicApproach, in G. BECKER & W. LANDES, ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT1, 35 (1974) ("The need for private action is especially great in highly interdependent modern econo-
mies."); Boostrom & Henderson, Community Action and Crime Prevention: Some Unresolved Issues,19 CRIME & Soc. JUST. 24 (1983) ("the criminal justice system might better be seen as a supplemen-tal resource for citizen crime prevention programs"). Business proprietors are often better situated
than the government to combat crime in the area under their immediate control. The police can dolittle more than patrol at random. Because of their lack of familiarity with the premises, the police
often cannot even take into account the weaknesses of security measures contained in particular loca-tions. See Note, supra note 13, at 1164-66. But absent legal incentives to act, the business community
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Judges, nevertheless, hesitate to penalize a party who, like the landlord,
cannot reasonably anticipate an accident. Ordinarily, mere awareness that
some general danger threatens a victim does not mandate liability.
7
'
Courts thus rely on foreseeability principles as a normative check on "the
scope of [any tort] duty that is based upon the relationship of the par-
ties." 7 2 Negligent security liability does, however, require a finding of
foreseeability. Sarah Kline proved that the 1500 Massachusetts Avenue
Corporation had reason to believe (1) crimes would occur on or near its
premises, and (2) tenants or bystanders would be injured.73 This showing
may have been less than courts demand in some negligence contexts, but it
was not unique.7 4 Absent a countervailing moral policy that justified plac-
ing the burden on the victim,"1 the defendant's knowledge of "conditions
...which constitute[d] a source of potential danger, imposed [on it] the
duty of active vigilance .... ,,76
Individual negligent security cases will, of course, present proof
problems.77 The victim must establish that the defendant "by reason of
tends to defer almost entirely to public crime prevention.
Unlike the bystander-rescue situation, there is little danger that imposing liability on negligent
security defendants will cause then to become vigilantes or "officious intermeddlers" into private af-
fairs. See, Note, Failure to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 631, 642 (1952). A
negligent security defendant must take crime-preventive measures in advance, at a time when there
will not yet be a criminal to lynch or a private matter with which the defendant can interfere. Liabil-
ity may, of course, encourage business proprietors to engage private security patrols. See, e.g., John-
ston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 577, 198 N.W.2d 409, 412 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting
"unfortunate phenomen[on]" of private industry's intrusion into public safety); Goldberg v. Housing
Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 589, 186 A.2d 291, 296 (1962) ("There is no room for the private devices of the
frontier days."). But a properly organized private security force, unlike a vigilante posse, represents
prevention rather than revenge. "Special police officers" are officially sanctioned in many states, see,
e.g., 4 D.C. CoDE ANN. § 4-111 (1981); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:19-8 (West 1978), and are now routine
for most large-scale commercial enterprises.
71. See, e.g., Cook v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 354 A.2d 507, 509-10 (D.C. 1976) (mere fact that
robbery may have been foreseeable did not create duty to prevent it); Samson v. Saginaw Professional
Bldg., Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 406, 224 N.W.2d 843, 855 (1975) (existence of duty depends on public
policy, not simply foreseeability); Goldberg v. Housing Authority, 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291,
293 (1962) ("Everyone can foresee the [possibility of] commission of crime virtually anywhere and at
any time."); see also Harper & Kime, supra note 63, at 887.
72. Note, supra note 13, at 1178.
73. See, e.g., Allen v. Babrab, Inc., 438 So. 2d 356, 357 (Fla. 1983).
74. A driver with faulty brakes, for example, does not know when his brakes will fail or whom he
will hit. A producer of a defective product cannot predict whether and how a future injury will occur.
These defendants are held morally accountable because they have knowledge of dangerous conditions.
75. Such policies are reflected in the assumption of the risk and contributory negligence doctrines.
76. Neering v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 383 I1. 366, 379, 50 N.E.2d 497, 503 (1943); see also Brown
v. J.C. Penney Co., 64 Or. App. 293, 667 P.2d 1047, 1051, affid, 297 Or. 695, 688 P.2d 811 (1984).
77. For example, given the virtual impossibility of anticipating precisely where crime will next
surface, see Fager, supra note 58, at 34, how much must the plaintiff prove that the defendant knew
or should have known? Compare Kline, 439 F.2d at 483 (knowledge of prior crimes sufficient) with
Latham v. Aronov Realty Co., 435 So. 2d 209, 213 (Ala. 1983) (failure to prove knowledge of spe-
cific, imminent crime is fatal) and Admiral's Port Condominium Ass'n v. Feldman, 426 So. 2d 1054,
1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (evidence of similar off-the-premises crimes not probative of foresee-
ability). Even if the plaintiff can show that the defendant knew some crime could occur, is that suffi-
cient to establish foreseeability of the specific crime and injury the plaintiff suffered? Compare Cain v.
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location, mode of doing business, or observation or past experience, should
reasonably [have] anticipate[d] criminal conduct" 78 that exposed the victim
to danger. In theory, however, the corrective justice approach, like the
instrumental analysis, amply supports the liability doctrine the court of
appeals established in Kline.7
C. The Process Objections to Negligent Security Liability
Over the past decade, a significant body of scholarship has focused on
the "process costs" of negligence litigation.80 Commentators agree that a
"reasonableness" standard can lead to fair results in routine accident cases
that correspond to jurors' everyday experience. 81 Process scholars, how-
Vontz, 703 F.2d 1279, 1283 (1lth Cir. 1983) ("liability does not depend upon anticipating the partic-
ular injury or that a particular person would be injured") and Courtney v. Remler, 566 F. Supp.
1225, 1232-33 (D.S.C. 1983) (generally increasing crime rate on resort island probative of foresee-
ability of danger at specific hotel) with Childers v. LCW Apartments, 333 N.W.2d 677, 679 (Neb.1983) (evidence of prior burglaries, theft, and vandalism did not establish notice of possible assault)
and Taylor v. Dixon, 8 Ohio App. 3d 161, 456 N.E.2d 558, 560 (1982) (seven prior robberies not
notice of possible shooting in course of eighth robbery), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848 (1983).The Kline court attempted to deal with the first problem by suggesting that foreseeability be provenby evidence of the "rate" of prior criminal activity. 439 F.2d at 483; see Gomez v. Ticor, 145 Cal.
App. 3d 622, 628, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1983); cf. Brown v. J.C. Penney Co., 64 Or. App. 293, 667P.2d 1047, 1049 (computer list of past crimes in store vicinity admissible evidence), aff d, 297 Or.695, 688 P.2d 811 (1984). But the emphasis on proof of actual prior criminal acts has been rejected as
too restrictive by most other courts. See, e.g., Neering v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 383 Ill. 366, 377, 50
N.E.2d 497, 502 (1943); Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 406, 224N.W.2d 843, 849 (1975); Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982). Notice
of criminal activity may often be a matter of common sense. See, e.g., Virginia D. v. Madesco Invest.
Corp., 648 S.W.2d 881, 887 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). There seems to be no more reason to require theplaintiff to introduce statistical proof or to limit the jury's discretion to consider all factors in the
crime-prevention context than in any other situation in which tort liability is sought to be imposed.
See, e.g., RESTATFMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 302, 448, 449 (1965).
Some courts have taken from the jury the issue of whether a history of one type of crime rendersforeseeable another type of crime. See, e.g., Gulf Reston Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 159, 207 S.E.2d
841, 845 (1974); Nigido v. First Nat. Bank of Baltimore, 264 Md. 702, 703, 288 A.2d 127, 128(1972). The question of what a defendant of ordinary prudence should foresee is, however, perfectly
suited to the application of common sense and community standards that is customarily the province
of a jury. See Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 281 S.E.2d 36, 40 (N.C. 1981).
78. Morris v. Barnette, 553 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
79. Negligent security plaintiffs have not yet sought more than an opportunity to submit theissues to a jury under a negligence standard. Yet corrective justice logic may support strict liability.Where a court adopts a normative justification for liability, a defendant arguably should not be able to
avoid responsibility by proving that it would have been "unreasonably" expensive to do the right
thing.
For purposes of this Article, we need not consider a strict liability approach, nor attempt to define a
coherent philosophical corrective justice foundation for negligence law as a whole. It is enough that
either traditional approach to tort regulation can justify negligent security liability.
80. The leading and most prolific commentator on the "process" approach has been Professor
Henderson. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 56; Henderson, The Boundary Problems of Enterprise
Liability, 41 MD. L. REv. 659 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Henderson, Boundary Problems]; Hender-
son, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choice: The Limits of Adjudication, 73COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973) [hereinafter cites as Henderson, Judicial Review]. But others have
adopted, or at least considered, the process focus. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 39; Twerski, supra note
1.
81. Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J.
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ever, become concerned when courts apply the same standard to complex
or technical fact patterns that defy a single "reasonable" solution."2 If ju-
rors attempt to fit common-sense reactions to these situations, verdicts be-
come unpredictable. 83 Jurors tend to rely on non-probative factors, such
as sympathy for the plaintiff or a belief in the defendant's deep pocket.
The more irrational the trend of the verdicts, the more likely it becomes
that future attorneys will bring meritless claims. Commercial defendants
then cannot know how to order their conduct.8 4
Process scholars argue that these effects justify terminating negligence
litigation before trial, even where substantive normative and functional
tort policies support liability.85 Other commentators question the validity
of process considerations as judicial criteria;86 in practice, few courts have
relied expressly on "process" to foreclose litigation. Process analysis does,
however, serve to explain numerous well-established but otherwise dubi-
ous no-duty rules.
8 7
Negligent security litigation presents significant process concerns. Fore-
most among these are problems of proving causation. For example, the
landlord's failure to take security measures in the Kline context clearly
facilitates crime as a whole. Yet in individual cases it is difficult to assess
whether the landlord's omission contributes specifically to the victim's as-
sault. Moreover, by definition, the criminal's conduct is an intervening
cause of the injury. 8 The jury's natural tendency to blur the issue of
467, 478 (1976); Henderson, supra note 56, at 911-12, 922-23.
82. Henderson, supra note 56, at 947-48; Henderson, Judicial Review, supra note 80, at 1541.
83. See generally Henderson, supra note 81; Henderson, supra note 56, at 903 (one goal of legal
adjudication is to set standards according to which defendants can govern their affairs and jurors can
decide cases).
84. The expense of trials may cause potential defendants to settle needlessly or stop conducting a
particular business activity altogether, rather than endure the burden of litigation. The cost of doing
business will increase.
85. Professor Henderson focuses primarily on barriers to products liability litigation. He argues
that the nature of manufacturing design decisions are "polycentric;" that is, subject to so many inter-
related variables that juries will not be able to second guess management decisions on the basis of any
definable standards. See, e.g., Henderson, Judicial Review, supra note 80, at 1536, 1541. This prob-
lem of polycentricity, according to Professor Henderson, militates in favor of removing products liabil-
ity cases from the courts and subjecting the entire subject matter to other forms of regulation. Id. at
1577-78.
86. See Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products
Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495, 496 (1976) ("Professor
Henderson is, in our opinion, wrong on all counts."). This Article does not take a position on whether
it is proper for courts to weigh procedural considerations instead of, or more heavily than, "substan-
tive" tort policies. However, to the extent courts consider "process," I submit that they should con-
sider the practical "political effects" of liability rules as well.
87. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 56, at 923-26, 943-45; Henderson, supra note 81, at
480-501 (explaining historical obstacles to litigation in suits by children against parents and malprac-
tice, products liability and environmental cases in process terms).
88. In most crime-prevention situations, it is virtually impossible to demonstrate with any degree
of certainty that a particular security measure would have deterred the criminal. See Hall v. Fraknoi,
69 Misc. 2d 470, 330 N.Y.S.2d 637, 641 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972) (security system may have delayed
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causation in the ordinary case89 is thus exacerbated in negligent security
cases by the unusually speculative nature of the inquiry.9
To make matters worse, in deciding what security measures are reason-
able and whether they would have been likely to prevent the injury, 91
jurors must rely on factors that are not part of their everyday experience.
The jury must consider, for example, the nature, cost, and operation of
available security measures, how those relate to marketing of the land-
lord's rental units, and the statistical probabilities that the security mea-
sures will reduce specific types of crime.92 The less jurors understand, the
more likely they are to decide according to gut reactions and personal
sympathies.9 3
Most of the cases rejecting negligent security liability have taken the
causation issue from the jury. The courts have held as a matter of law
either that the defendant's omission of security did not directly bring
about the plaintiff's injuries or that the criminal conduct was a supersed-
ing cause.94 The courts' refusal to allow juries to decide causation issues
normally within the jurors' province suggests that process concerns were
on the judges' minds.
criminal's entry but would not have prevented it). Not even "[tlhe most specialized and highly-trained
government security personnel can predict and prevent these incidents" with any guarantee of success.
Fager, supra note 58, at 34. Nor can it be proven that the criminal would not have injured someone
else had the defendant protected the plaintiff.
89. Cf. Henderson, Why Creative Judging Won't Save the Products Liability System, 11 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 845, 852 (1983) (noting tendency of courts "to play fast and loose with the [causation]
requirement" in product design cases). As a practical matter, by allowing jurors to infer causation
from the facts, a court may tacitly shift the burden to the defendant to "disprove" causation. Process-
sensitive judges may thus have resisted negligent security liability for fear that future courts would
hold defendants liable even where, realistically, the defendants could have done nothing to prevent the
injuries.
Such a theory of judicial self-mistrust, however, would paralyze the courts. Carried to its logical
conclusion, it cautions judges against adopting principled rules because of a general sense that courts
are incapable of enforcing them.
90. The other element which juries can easily manipulate is "foreseeability." See id. at 849 (pro-posing strict foresecability requirement). Assessing foreseability in the negligent security context
presents serious difficulties. See supra note 77. Some courts have thus implemented process concernsby imposing strict foreseeability rules that negligent security plaintiffs will rarely, if ever, be able to
satisfy. See, e.g., Kveragas v. Scottish Inns, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 258, 259 (E.D. Tenn. 1983); Latham v.
Aronov Realty Co., 435 So. 2d 209, 214 (Ala. 1983).
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 302A, 320, 435, 449 (1965).
92. See supra note 85.
93. Jury sympathy inevitably rests with crime victims. Commercial enterprises are likely to be
viewed as deep-pocket, perhaps even insured, defendants. Jurors will also have difficulty imagining
themselves in defendants' shoes. With the benefit of hindsight, they may hold enterprises responsiblefor failing to take crime-preventive measures which did not in fact appear reasonably necessary at the
time of the crime. Under process reasoning, society may thus prefer to leave safety and security deci-
sions for control through direct regulation or the exercise of discretion by an appropriate "enterprise
manager," rather than to haphazard adjudication by jury fiat. See Henderson, supra note 89, at 847;
Henderson, supra note 81, at 478-79.
94. See, e.g., Altepeter v. Virgil State Bank, 345 Ill. App. 585, 602-03, 104 N.E.2d 334, 342(1952); Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291, 297-98 (1962); Cornpropst v. Sloan,
528 S.W.2d 188, 198 (Tenn. 1975).
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Process analysis thus helps explain why many judges have resisted neg-
ligent security liability despite the modern trend towards liberalized liabil-
ity. Allowing the full range of negligent security claims to proceed would,
given the level of urban crime, raise the spectre of endless litigation. Al-
though normative and functional doctrines support the recent decisions
permitting negligent security litigation, process constraints seem to favor
maintaining a no-duty rule.
II. THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF TORT LIABILITY
Should the courts succumb to the strong substantive reasons for al-
lowing claims to proceed? Or should they bow to the practical considera-
tions favoring a barrier effective at the pleading stage? Part II of this
Article suggests that the courts can best resolve their dilemma by consider-
ing the "political effect" of tort liability rules.95
Ordinarily, of course, courts should decide liability questions solely on
the basis of substantive tort theory. Under the model I propose, politics
come into play only where secondary practical concerns-usually process
concerns-prevent the courts from implementing traditional analysis
favoring liability. The practical political consequences of legal rules are
every bit as real as process considerations. The fact that a doctrine may
stimulate regulatory solutions to the root cause of the litigation can legiti-
mately offset process concerns. A doctrine's beneficial political side-effects
should thus, on occasion, be sufficient to overcome judges' doubts about
entertaining a new category of cases. 8
This Article's political effects model acknowledges, and indeed depends
upon, the notion that legislatures and administrative bodies are better
suited than courts to deal with most social issues.97 Lawmakers and regu-
95. The common perception of the judiciary is that of an independent body, immune from politi-
cal considerations, that decides cases only upon the substantive merits. See, e.g., Diver, The Judge as
Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REv. 43,
89 (1979) ("the prospect of a judge intervening actively in governmental politics offends cherished
images of the judicial function").
96. Focusing on tort's political effects may also provide an alternative approach for courts con-
cerned with the confusion that artificial, process-based rules may generate. In Rowland v. Christian,
69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), for example, the California Supreme Court
imposed a general duty of reasonable care on landowners for the primary reason that the traditional
approach of categorizing the rights of different entrants had become so confusing as to be unmanage-
able. The Rowland court's abrogation of the old rules, though perhaps correct, was hardly principled.
Had the court relied instead on tort's political effects, its decision to look past the process concerns
embodied in the categorical approach might have been more palatable.
97. See, e.g., D. HoRowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL PoLIcY 257, 298 (1977); Bickel & Wel-
lington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1,
25 (1957); Henderson, Judicial Review, supra note 80, at 1531, 1567. But see Peck, Comments on
Judicial Creativity, 69 IOWA L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Peck, Comments]; Peck, The
Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REy. 265 (1963)
(suggesting that in some areas courts are more suited than legislatures to deal with social problems).
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lators, however, often ignore conditions requiring redress, particularly
when no vocal constituency is affected. Judges presented with actual con-
troversies, in contrast, have a duty to decide. 8 In the course of resolving
cases, they may identify recurrent dangerous activity unknown to the
lawmakers or learn that an obvious danger is more significant that it ap-
pears on the surface.
A court faced with such cases might refuse to extend negligence liability
because of practical, process concerns.99 Allowing cases to proceed on the
merits, however, may spur a legislative or administrative response that
ultimately will eliminate case-by-case decision-making. These potential
political effects should make the court more willing to accept the interim
process costs. The liability rule potentially is temporary. In the short
term, it provides relief for victims that substantive tort policies suggest are
appropriate. In the long term, it may hasten an overall solution to the
underlying social problem. In some circumstances, the new rule may itself
bring about changes in social conditions that can ease the legislature's
burden in arriving at a solution. 00
These are only broad outlines for when a court might appropriately
consider the political ramifications of a tort doctrine. Implementation of
these basic considerations is far more complex. The following Sections il-
lustrate the political effects model in more detail.
A. Examples of the Political Effects Model at Work
On rare occasions courts have proceeded as if a political response was
their goal. Their decisions have played a valuable role in providing stop-
gap solutions to social problems, enabling political coalitions to form, and
framing important issues for legislative consideration. In hindsight, it is
fair to conclude that the resulting legislative attention, compromise, and
regulation would not have come about without the spur of judicial action.
By analyzing a few of these examples, we can determine how the political
effects model works in practice and distill criteria for its implementation
in future settings.
98. See J. SAX, supra note 1, at 111.
99. See, e.g., Henderson, Judicial Review, supra note 80, at 1546. Process reasoning does not
always require an immunity rule. It may, alternatively, call for clear "strict liability" that avoids the
process consequences of ordinary negligence litigation. I focus on the immunity aspect of the process
scholarship because that is the context to which torts political effects are most relevant.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 184-86.
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1. Railroad Litigation and Workmen's Compensation'"1
In the 1800's, American and English courts confronted a continuing
series of accidents in which the negligence of railroad workers injured
other employees.10" The courts quickly developed a tort doctrine that kept
victims' lawsuits from getting to the jury stage: the "fellow-servant"
rule.103 The early decisions did not establish that substantive negligence
policies required this legal barrier."0 Rather, the decisions had the clear
purpose and effect of saving courts and railroads from a flood of
litigation.10 5
The fellow-servant rule should have forecast an end to railway accident
cases. But in reacting to the transaction costs of railroad litigation, the
courts had underestimated the significance of the social conditions to
which the lawsuits responded. Railway accidents did not disappear.106
Victims, having nowhere else to turn, continued to bring cases in great
numbers.10 7 In order to allow individual compelling cases to proceed on
the merits, subsequent judges created a series of doctrinal exceptions to
101. The following discussion draws heavily on the work of Friedman & Ladinsky, Social
Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967).
102. The incidence of these accidents was substantial: I.C.C. figures suggest that around the turn
of the twentieth century three to five percent of all American railway employees suffered injury. See
id. at 60 n.34. Statistics on industrial accidents generally reveal an enormous toll of injury, more than
2,000,000 every year. See E. DOWNEY, HISTORY OF WORK AccIDENT INDEMNITY IN IOWA 1-2
(1912).
103. The fellow-servant rule maintained the artificial and perhaps contrary-to-fact principle that
employees assumed the risk of industrial accidents. In the seminal case, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of
the Massachusetts Supreme Court reasoned that wages for railroad workers already took into account
the possibility of accident. Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842);
see also Murray v. South Carolina R.R., 26 S.C.L. (1 McMul.) 385 (1841) and the key English
precedent, Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng. R. 1030 (Ex. 1837).
104. Initially, the courts had a choice of holding railroads accountable for their employees' negli-
gence or creating an immunity in favor of the railroads. Either option was substantively justifiable.
The railroad encouraged the work of the negligent employees. It also had a sufficient relationship
with both sets of workers that a court might reasonably have found a duty to supervise against negli-
gence or a separate duty to protect the non-negligent employee from harm. See supra note 17. Indeed,
under traditional respondeat superior principles, contemporary observers probably would have ex-
pected courts to consider the negligent employee the railroad's agent for purposes of liability. See 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 429-30; Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 101, at 53.
105. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 101, at 55-58, suggest that this result was not as heart-
less as it seems. In a time of economic growth and a society changing from its dependence on agricul-
ture to newly developing industry, additional expense might have seriously impeded the advance of
technology. See also M. HoRwrrz, supra note 16, at 94-101 (discussing creation of immunities to
support economic development).
106. Indeed, due largely to the lack of incentives for railroads to improve conditions, accidents
increased. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 101, at 60.
107. Id. at 59-60.
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circumvent the fellow-servant barrier.1"8 Thus, we find that cases contin-
ued to flow and that plaintiffs won many of their lawsuits.10 9
The next stage in the development of the railway litigation illustrates
the political impact that changes in tort doctrine can have. The courts' ad
hoc tinkering with the harsh fellow-servant rule made the results in indi-
vidual accident cases extremely unpredictable. The well-established rail-
road lobby thus became concerned with not only the outcome, but also the
irrationality, of verdicts. Railroads were being forced to pay substantialjudgments-in addition to insurance costs and litigation expenses-but
could not predict in which cases they would have to pay. 10 Moreover,
lawyers received much of the money railroads allocated for victim com-
pensation, thus worsening employee morale.1 1' Eventually, it came to be
in the railroads' interests to take accident-preventive measures and to seek
a national legislative solution to the question of victim compensation." 2
Unlike the railroads, the victims were initially not organized. Individual
victims had no common interest other than the source of their injuries.'13
But as the railroads raised the issue of compensation in the legislatures,
champions of the victims' point of view stood forth in public debate to
resist the industry claims. 1 4 In addition, large and frequent verdicts pub-
licized the significance of railroad injuries. Unions, interested in other as-
pects of industrial safety, now took up the issue and provided a counter-
point to the railroad lobbies in the legislatures." 5
108. The "vice principal" rule, for example, permitted a victim/employee to sue his employer
where the negligent employee occupied a supervisory position. See Haley v. Case, 142 Mass. 316, 7N.E. 877 (1886); see also 4 C. LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT § 1434, at 4143 (1913). Some courtsfound a duty of the employer to provide a "safe place to work, safe tools and safe appliances." Fried-
man & Ladinsky, supra note 101, at 62; see Wedgewood v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 41 Wis. 478 (1877).Judges tended to allow cases to "go to the jury" where the victim stood a good chance to recoverdespite the legal rules which seemed to foreclose recovery. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 101,
at 61; Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, in R. RABIN,
PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 44, 55 (2d ed. 1983).
109. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 101, at 60; L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 424.
110. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 101, at 65.
111. See W. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 22-23 (1936).
112. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 101, at 66-69.
113. Railroad victims were even more isolated than victims of other types of industrial accidents.
Victims of dangerous activities in a factory generally lived in a community near the factory. By con-
trast, railroad employees usually were injured on the road. Local communities had no interest inpublicly supporting migrant workers. Because proper venue for lawsuits often lay at the situs of an
accident, the physical separation also hampered victims' ability to recover by depriving them of "home
town juries."
114. Champions were found within the judiciary, see Driscoll v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 144 Wis.
451, 468-69, 129 N.W. 401, 408-09 (1911) (Winslow, C.J., concurring); Houg v. Girard LumberCo., 144 Wis. 337, 352, 129 N.W. 633, 639 (1911) (Marshall, J., concurring), the scholarly commu-
nity, see Pound, The Need of Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607, 614 (1907); Walton,Workmen's Compensation and the Theory of Professional Risk, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 36 (1911),
among politicians, see E. DOWNEY, supra note 102, at 277 n.540 (1912) (quoting Theodore
Roosevelt), and in the press, see 97 THE OUTLOOK 955-60 (1917).
115. See H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 320-25 (1954).
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By the early twentieth century, the expansion of negligence liability had
contributed to a significant change in societal attitudes. "[Ilndustrial acci-
dents and the shortcomings of the fellow-servant rule were [now] widely
perceived as problems that had to be solved."11 Railroads began to imple-
ment safety measures. Unions began to educate their members on the dan-
gers and to demand change. Political coalitions and lobbies formed. Legis-
latures began to investigate solutions.
1 1 7
From this atmosphere, the modern formula for worker's compensation
emerged. The legislatures compromised. Employee/victims won adoption
of a strict liability compensation scheme for all work-related injuries. In
exchange, recovery tables capped the potential awards and worker's com-
pensation was made the exclusive remedy for employee injuries. The
fellow-servant rule was abolished.11 s
This Solomonic solution accepted neither the early tort rules of the
fellow-servant era nor the tendency of the later cases to shift the full bur-
den to the employers. But it was a scheme that both the emerging railroad
industry and victims could tolerate. It persists to this day. Without the
emergence of the stopgap judicial liability principles, the issue of accident
victimization might never have gained prominence, the legal issues would
not have been as clearly framed, and the legislative solutions we know
today might never have been reached.
2. Medical Malpractice
Recent trends in medical malpractice litigation provide subtler but
equally illustrative insights into the political effect of tort doctrines. From
1935 through 1955, 605 medical malpractice decisions were reported.
Only 107 resulted in plaintiffs' verdicts. 1 9 Less than thirty years later,
the medical profession decries the state of malpractice litigation as a "cri-
sis."'120 Proposals for reforming malpractice law and medical victim com-
pensation abound.1 21 Numerous legislatures have passed statutes favoring
116. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 101, at 69.
117. Id. at 69-70; see also W. DODD, supra note 111, at 18.
118. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 101, at 70-72.
119. Stetler, The History of Reported Medical Professional Liability Cases, 30 TEMPLE L.Q.
366, 368-69 (1957).
120. See M. REDISH, LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS: CON-
STITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 1 (1977). For statistics and discussions of recent trends, see U.S. DEPT.
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE SEcdY'S COMM'N
ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 2-3, 5-13 (Pub. No. 73-88, Jan. 16, 1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW
REPORT]; U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, APPENDIX: REPORT OF THE SEC'Y's
COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE [hereinafter cited as HEW APP.].
121. See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILrrY, DESIGNATED COMPENSA-
BLE EVENT SYSTEM: A FEASIBILITY STUDY (1979); Ehrenzweig, Compulsory "Hospital-Accident"
Insurance: A Needed First Step Toward the Displacement of Liability for "Medical Malpractice,"
31 U. CHs. L. REV. 279 (1964); Havighurst & Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance"--A No
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physician-defendants.122 How did the issue transform itself from a subject
of trivial import to one of the burning political and social questions of our
time?
Unlike the fellow-servant cases, courts have long accepted malpractice
as a valid subset of general negligence law.12 3 A plaintiff is entitled to ajury determination on whether the doctor has exercised "such reasonable
skill and diligence as are ordinarily exercised in his profession." ' 24 The
dearth of cases in the early period seems in large part1 25 to have been due
to a "conspiracy . . . of silence."12 In order to succeed, a plaintiff must
usually introduce the testimony of a physician who will testify that the
treating doctor failed to satisfy the requisite standard of care. For reasons
of collegiality, fear of reprisals from their own malpractice insurers, and
unwillingness to subject themselves to cross-examination, physicians in the
early period hesitated to testify. 27 Several legal doctrines helped defend-
ants obtain pre-trial dismissals and directed verdicts by enhancing plain-
tiffs' difficulty in obtaining expert testimony.128
Fault Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 1974 INs. L.J. 69.122. See HEW REPORT, supra note 120, at 9-16; White & McKenna, Constitutionality of Re-
cent Medical Malpractice Legislation, 13 FORUM 312 (1977); Comment, An Analysis of State Legis-lative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417 (1975).123. See C. STmTLER & A. MORTIZ, DOCTOR AND PATIENT, AND THE LAW 306-07 (4th ed.1962); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549 (1959).124. McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. (10 Harris) 261, 267-68 (1853); see Leighton v. Sargent, 31
N.H. 119, 132 (1855).
125. Of course, other explanations exist both for the limited number of early malpractice cases
and for the recent expansion of liability. These include (1) the fact that personal injury claims ingeneral were rarer, (2) a lower level of insurance, which made doctors less attractive targets for suit,(3) a lesser expectation of exactness in medical science and technique, (4) a smaller malpractice bar
willing to file suit on a contingent fee basis, and (5) a closer relationship between patients and unspe-
cialized family doctors, with the resulting hesitation to sue. See Note, Medical Malpractice Litigation:Some Suggested Improvements and a Possible Alternative, 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 623, 623 (1966);Stewart, The Malpractice Problem-Its Cause and Cure: The Physician's Perspective, 51 IND. L.J.
134 (1975). Nevertheless, the increased availability of expert assistance is probably the single mostdominant feature in the recent expansion of malpractice litigation. See S. LAW & S. POLAN, PAIN
AND PROFIT 98 (1978).
126. Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 VILL. L. REv.
250, 251 (1956); see also Note, Malpractice and Medical Testimony, 77 HARV. L. REv. 333, 336-38
(1963).
127. D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 193-95 (1973).
128. For example, courts ruled early on that a malpractice plaintiff must prove that the treating
physician breached the general standard of care in the locality in which he practiced. Some courts
interpreted this standard to require expert testimony of a local physician, see, e.g., Tanner v. Sanders,247 Ky 90, 96, 56 S.W.2d 718, 721 (1933), or, at the very minimum, a physician of a sister region of
comparable size and sophistication, see, e.g., Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 136 (1880). Thelikelihood of obtaining the assistance of a doctor in a suit against his neighbor, particularly in a small
community, was virtually nil.
The "school of practice" doctrine also handicapped plaintiffs' efforts to secure expertise. The rule
allowed a practitioner to be judged only according to that "system of medicine" which he purported topractice. A doctor trained at a traditional American medical school could thus not dispute the reasona-
bleness of treatment by a less orthodox physician who believed in drugless therapy, a chiropractor
who believed in treatment by manipulation of the spinal column, or a healer who relied on the use of
natural herbs. See McCoid, supra note 123, at 560-64.
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As in the railroad litigation context, however, the legal impediments to
malpractice liability soon broke down. Victims, with nowhere to turn for
assistance but the courts, continued to bring cases. Courts, compelled by
cases which substantively deserved at least jury consideration, created ex-
ceptions to the doctrinal barriers.129 Again we find a continuing flow of
injuries and cases, ad hoc judicial reactions, and an uncertain situation in
which plaintiffs were able to win many lawsuits in the face of initially
unfavorable legal obstacles."' 0
The effects of the changes in physicians' liability paralleled the develop-
ments in the worker's compensation context. Doctors for the first time had
to confront the realistic possibility of losing negligence suits. Conflicting
judicial rules made it difficult for physicians and insurers to predict liabil-
ity, 3 ' for it was no longer clear when courts would prevent juries from
hearing the merits. Doctors began to avoid risky courses of treatment.
1 32
More significantly, political activity erupted. The medical lobby,
133
headed by the AMA, saw the need to introduce more certainty into the
litigation picture. It began to urge legislative and privately-arranged solu-
tions to the problem of victim compensation.1 34 The insurance lobby
129. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur occasionally enabled plaintiffs to dispense altogether with
expert testimony. See McCoid, supra note 123, at 621-31.
Some judges tempered the "locality" principle by ruling that the "borders of the locality [extend] so
as to include those centers readily accessible." Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 349, 294 N.W. 183,
188 (1940). With developing modes of modem transportation, these courts thus opened virtually the
entire United States as fair game for malpractice comparisons. See McCoid, supra note 123, at
570-75; see also Curran, Problems of Establishing a Standard of Care, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
15, 19-21 (E. Shapiro, A. Needham, E. Gass, S. Karlstrom & J. Arrowsmith eds. 1966). Courts, on
occasion, also limited the locality doctrine's effect by allowing plaintiffs' attorneys to cross-examine
the treating physician with reference to general medical treatises that incorporated national and inter-
national standards of care. See id. at 21; see also S. LAW & S. POLAN, supra note 125, at 100 (1978)
("The erosion of the locality rule has probably had greater impact on the increase in malpractice
claims in recent years than any other change in the law.").
The "school of practice" rule also weakened. The doctor's right to rely on his school of practice
gave way where the doctor led a patient to believe he had the ability to make a diagnosis beyond his
limitations. This exception tended to subsume all physicians who held themselves out as "general
practitioners." See McCoid, supra note 123, at 561-73.
130. Courts also loosened the requirements of other legal doctrines that helped limit malpractice
litigation. For example, exceptions to rigid statutes of limitations have been expanded. See, e.g., D.
HARNEY, supra note 127, at 249. Judges created the new doctrine of "informed consent." See Salgo v.
Leland Stanford, Jr., University Bd. of Trust., 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957); J. KATZ,
THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 48-84 (1984). Each of these developments further
illustrates how shifts in basic tort principles realigned burdens in the malpractice field. See generally
HEW REPORT, supra note 120, at 27-30.
131. See The Problems of Insuring Medical Malpractice, in Continuing Medical Malpractice
Insurance Crisis 1975: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Sen. Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 185 (1975).
132. See, e.g., HEW REPORT, supra note 120, at 14-15; AEI, THE MEDICAL MALPRACnCE
DILEMNA 4-5 (1976); see also sources cited infra note 139.
133. See Peck, Comments, supra note 97, at 18 ("members of the healthcare professions. . . are
experienced in lobbying for or against legislation, as are insurance companies").
134. See C. PHILIP & R. FAUST, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PANELS IN FOUR STATES 13 (1977);
American Pub. Health Ass'n, Policy On Malpractice, 67 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 96 (1977); Mills,
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sought protective legislation. To dramatize the problem they raised premi-
ums at a geometric rate. 35
On the other side, publicity surrounding large verdicts and the legisla-
tive push by the medical lobby inevitably drew attention to the incidence
of malpractice. Opponents to limitations on liability 35 and champions of
medical consumers came to the spotlight. They organized opposition to the
anti-liability, pro-defendant campaigns, and gave voice to the formerly un-
represented victim class.1 3 7
It is too early to ascertain the final results the changes in tort doctrine
have wrought. 13  But the shift of the bias in the case law from the
stronger to the weaker political group has clearly provoked not only coali-
tions "for" and "against" victim compensation, but a new attitude. The
prospect of liability created an emphasis-some argue even an overempha-
sis1 3'-on safety techniques in medical practice. Consumer awareness is at
an all-time high, a fact which itself contributes to safer treatment.1 40
Commissions have been established to study alternative methods of victim
compensation.1 41 Legislatures are experimenting with compromise solu-
tions to balance the desire for victim compensation and society's need for a
stable and not-too-timid medical profession. 42 Although several legisla-
Malpractice Litigation: Are Solutions in Sight?, 232 J. A.M.A. 369 (1975); Roth & Rosenthal, Non
Fault Based Medical Injury Compensation Systems, in HEW App., supra note 120, at 450; Virginia
Research Group, Alternatives to Litigation, IV. The Law of Arbitration in the United States, in
HEW APP., supra note 120, at 346.
135. See M. REDISH, supra note 120, at 1; SUBCOMM. ON EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION TO
THE SENATE COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
THE PATIENT VERSUS THE PHYSICIAN (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter cited as MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE: THE PATIENT VERSUS THE PHYSICIAN].
136. See C. PHILIP & R. FAUST, supra note 134, at 24 (opposition to New Mexico's panel
system and recovery limitation); The Medical Malpractice War, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 27, 1984, at 1, col. 1(quoting proponents and opponents to changes in malpractice system).
137. See, e.g., Neubauer & Henke, Medical Malpractice Legislation: Laws Based on a False
Premise, 21 TRIAL 64 (1985); cf. People v. Smithtown Gen. Hosp., 93 Misc. 2d 736, 402 N.Y.S.2d
318 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (prosecution for permitting unauthorized practice of surgery in hospital).
138. While some commentators are prepared to concede that no workable solution is possible,
others point to existing systems in other countries that appear to have reached accommodations be-
tween the needs of patients and doctors. See, e.g., Grauers, Medical Malpractice in Sweden, 21 TRIAL
52, 54-55 (1985).
139. See, e.g., R. CoTs, THE TRUTH ABOUT MEDICAL MALPRACTICES: THE PATIENT'S
RIGHTS, THE DOCTOR'S RIGHTS 178-79 (1975); D. HARNEY, supra note 127, at 92; A. HOLDER,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 414-15 (1975); MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT VERSUS
THE PHYSICIAN, supra note 135, at 2, 6, 22, 457; Symposium: The 1975 Indiana Medical Malprac-
tice Act, Introduction: The Indiana Act in Context, 51 IND. L.J. 91, 92 (1975).
140. See, e.g., C. PHILIP & R. FAUST, supra note 134, at 5; L. WILLIAMS, How To AVOID
UNNECESSARY SURGERY (1971).
141. See Symposium, supra note 139, at 102; Baird, Monsterman, & Stevens, Alternatives to
Litigation I: Technical Analysis, in HEW APP., supra note 120, at 215; see also R. GoTs, supra
note 139, at 185-209.
142. See, e.g., Medical Malpractice Act, 1977 N.M. Laws, ch. 284, § 3 (compensation fund); 15
S.D.C.L. § 2-22.1 (1984) (applying statute of limitations to minors); see also N.J. S. 604 (1977) and
New Hampshire H.R. 314 (ch. 417 ) (1977) (compensation limits); Medical Liability and Insurance
Improvement Act § 8.01 (Tex. 1977) (creating cause of action against attorneys who bring frivolous
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tures have passed laws that, once again, limit plaintiffs' right to sue,143 the
public debate has not come to an end. 1 " Absent the shift in tort emphasis,
the pressure even to consider novel alternatives would in all likelihood not
have occurred.
3. Environmental Litigation
Today, we recognize government's right and obligation to regulate ac-
tivities that pollute the environment. That development, however, is re-
cent. It was in some measure inspired by environmental tort litigation.
Originally, environmental causes of action were strictly confined.
Courts refused to acknowledge any right of private parties to challenge
polluting activities that injured the public as a whole.1 45 With time, the
courts began to recognize that substantive tort policies supported lawsuits
aimed at "public nuisances. "'14 They authorized occasional private plain-
tiffs to challenge conduct that "interfere[d] with the rights of the commu-
nity at large. '1 47
From the outset, courts expressed concern over the process consequences
of allowing environmental suits.1 48 They feared opening the floodgates of
litigation. As a result, the courts developed various procedural prerequi-
sites to suit that virtually eliminated the possibility of success.
149 Most of
these cut litigation off pre-trial or before the merits had to be decided.150
malpractice actions).
143. Some legislatures, for example, responded to increasing malpractice litigation by capping
liability, trimming "informed consent" rules, and requiring plaintiffs to pursue remedies other than
litigation. See generally M. REDISH, supra note 120, at 3-4, 9-16 (citing sources); Comment, supra
note 122.
144. According to one authority, medical malpractice and malpractice insurance is "one of the
nations most visible social and political issues." The Problems of Insuring Medical Malpractice,
supra note 131, at 185; see also Note, Rethinking Medical Malpractice Law in Light of Medicare
Cost-Cutting, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1017-22 (1985).
145. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 1004-06 (1966).
146. Public nuisance theory was the primary legal basis through which private plaintiffs could
challenge large scale environmental hazards. Trespass, negligence, strict liability for ultrahazardous
activities, and the law of riparian rights were others. For the most part, these legal theories also
started out as dead ends but were revived by judicial tinkering with the traditional doctrine. See
Maloney, Judicial Protection of the Environment: A New Role for Common-Law Remedies, 25
VAND. L. REV. 145, 149-52 (1972); see also W. PROSSER, J. WADE, & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ToRTs 838 (1976).
147. Prosser, supra note 145, at 999.
148. See, e.g., Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. California, 437 F.2d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971).
149. See, e.g., Reitze, Private Remediesfor Environmental Wrongs, 5 SurrOLx L. REV. 778, 803
(1971).
150. For example, a representative plaintiff was allowed to proceed only if he could prove "spe-
cial damages," differing in kind from that of the general public. See, e.g., Burgess v. M/V Tamano,
370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973); Strickland v. Lambert, 268 Ala. 580, 109 So. 2d 664 (1959);
Bouquet v. Hackensack Water Co., 101 A. 379 (N.J. 1917). If the plaintiff settled in the area of the
pollution voluntarily-that is, "came to the nuisance"-he was deemed to have assumed the risk. See,
e.g., Waschak v. Moffat, 379 Pa. 441, 452, 109 A.2d 310, 316 (1954). Some courts also barred public
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As in the railroad and malpractice contexts, however, individual judges
succumbed to the temptation of reaching the merits of compelling cases. 151
By the late 1950's or early 1960's, courts regularly ignored the barriers to
environmental nuisance litigation.1 52 As a result of these inconsistent legal
developments, polluting industries for the first time faced a realistic
chance of losing environmental litigation,153 but could not always predict
when. Ultimately, it was in their interest to take anti-pollution mea-
sures. 15  At the same time, industry sought redress in the form of statutes
and regulations that would vindicate their right to pollute.
In the environmental context, the activism of the courts had an addi-
tional political effect not present, or at least not as prominent, in the
worker's compensation and malpractice settings. The occasional, contro-
nuisance suits wherever the state, by any form of legislation, sanctioned the general enterprise engaged
in by defendant. See, e.g., National Container Corp. v. State ex rel. Stockton, 138 Fla. 32, 189 So. 4(1939) (tax exemption for establishing plant held to implicitly sanction plant's activities); see also
Maloney, supra note 146, at 147-48 nn.12-16 (citing authorities). Others restricted the categories of
"tnuisance" to activities that were a crime. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, J. WADE, & V. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 146, at 837; Maloney, supra note 146, at 155. Courts routinely denied injunctive relief on the
basis that the "balance of convenience"-i.e. the economic importance of defendant's activi-
ties-required that the polluting enterprise be allowed to continue its operations. See, e.g., Madison v.
Ducktown Sulpher, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 336, 83 S.W. 658, 666 (1904); see also
Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 DUKE L.J.
1126, 1131-34; Maloney, supra note 146, at 147-48, 160. In some instances, courts even acknowl-
edged a defendant's wrongdoing but held that it had obtained a "prescriptive right" to carry on its
activities by virtue of the fact that no one had challenged them in the past. See, e.g., Dangelo v.
McLean Fire Brick Co., 287 F. 14 (6th Cir. 1923); Hulbert v. California Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239,
244, 118 P. 928, 930 (1911); W.G. Duncan Coal Co. v. Jones, 254 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Ky. Ct. App.
1953). All in all, it was extremely difficult to bring successful environmental litigation at common
law.
151. Judges applied the special damage requirement haphazardly. Some merely required a show-
ing of substantial harm. See Prosser, supra note 145, at 1009 n.100; W. PROSSER, J. WADE, & V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 146, at 841-42 (1976). Many courts demoted "coming to the nuisance" from
its status as a legal defense to being merely one factor to be considered in evaluating the merits. See,
e.g., Juergensmeyer, Common Law Remedies and Protection of the Environment, 6 U. BRITISH CO-
LUMBIA L. REV. 215, 218 (1971); Maloney, supra note 146, at 156 and authorities cited therein.
Prescriptive rights of defendants were rarely recognized. See, e.g., Stamm v. City of Albuquerque, 10
N.M. 491, 503, 62 P. 973, 974 (1900); see also Juergensmeyer, supra note 150, at 1136 n.31. The
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1966), explicitly limited the rule that only crimes could
rise to the nuisance level, providing instead that all "unreasonable" activities qualified. See also W.
PROSSER, J. WADE, & V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 146, at 837.
152. In addition to changing the legal obstacles to environmental litigation, modern courts also
produced numerous affirmative innovations that eased plaintiffs' task in limiting environmental
hazards. See Reitze, Private Remedies for Environmental Wrongs, 5 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 779,
810-19 (1971).
153. See, e.g., Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972);
Bcomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257, N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
154. See National Environmental Poliy: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Interior and Insu-
lar Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 178 (1969) (statement of Edwin M. Wheeler, Pres., National Plant
Food Institute) [hereinafter cited as Environmental Hearing]; see also L. WENNER, THE ENVIRON-
MENTAL DECADE IN COURT 1-2 (1982) (NEPA's passage was "relatively noncontroversial" and was
"the culmination of a long process . . . during which conflicting interests argued their points of
view"); Diamond, What Business Thinks, FORTUNE, Feb. 1970, at 118-19, 171-72; cf. L. WENNER,
supra, at 170 (environmentalists have used courts in other spheres, but "eventually the legislative
branch simply overturned that action").
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versial, litigation successes gave environmentalists a public platform
needed to galvanize support. The decisions contributed to an atmosphere
of public debate and public interest.1 55 Thus, in the 1960's we see a dra-
matic surge in the membership of environmental groups,156 the filing of
additional lawsuits, 157 and active participation of environmentalists in the
legislative process. 158
The most significant result of the change in legal doctrine was political:
state and federal legislatures intervened. With the beginning of the 1970's,
heavy governmental regulation of the environment became the norm.159 As
in the railroad and malpractice contexts, the legislation for the most part
compromised. The National Environmental Protection Act,1'0 for exam-
ple, chose neither to ban polluting activities outright nor to permit feder-
ally supported enterprises to continue environmentally destructive conduct.
It adopted the alternative of requiring environmental impact studies. 6 '
Other legislation and executive action established supervisory agencies to
implement the Act's protections."6 2 These compromise measures satisfied
neither industry nor environmentalists, but were acceptable to both
groups.
It is going too far to credit the changing tort rules with all of the mod-
ern regulatory developments. Certainly the prosperity and general activ-
ism of the 1960's had as much to do with the willingness of citizens and
industry to bear the expense of environmental protection. Nevertheless,
judicial activism that circumvented the legal doctrines favoring polluters
unquestionably played some role in raising citizen consciousness on the
problems of pollution. It encouraged public debate and directed industry
and environmental groups alike toward legislative remedies. The conse-
155. See, e.g., State High Court Ruling Allows Factory Air Pollution at a Price, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 6, 1970, at 45, col. 3 (article on Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.); Back to Caveat Emptor, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 24, 1969, § IV, at 12, col. 2. (editorial applauding law suit against car manufacturers for
causing Los Angeles pollution); Los Angeles County Files Antismog Suit, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1969,
at 24, col. 3 ($100 million suit by Los Angeles county against car manufacturers).
156. See generally Bowling, The New Conservationist, 1 J. ENV. ED. 78, 78-79 (1970); Koenig,
Additional Research on Environmental Activism, 4 ENV. & BEHAV. 472 (1975).
157. See L. WENNER, supra note 154, at 21.
158. See Environmental Hearing, supra note 154, at 145 (statement of Michael McCloskey,
Sierra Club); id. at 153 (statement of Louis Clapper, Director of Conservation, National Wildlife
Federation); id. at 175 (statement of Anthony Smith, President & General Counsel, National Parks
Ass'n.).
159. Many states enacted their own version of NEPA. See, e.g., CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§
21100-21176 (West 1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 1001 (1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41 §§
447-451 (repealed 1973).
160. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (1982).
161. Id. § 4332(B).
162. See authorities cited in V. YANNACONE & B. COHEN, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REM-
EDIES §§ 7.8-7.9 at 476-79, § 7.17 at 566, § 7.28 at 621 (1972).
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quence was a new regulatory order that, in the absence of judicial action,
might have taken decades to come about.1 6 3
4. Summary
Because courts that undermined the industrial accident, malpractice,
and environmental immunities never fully explained their decisions, it is
impossible to prove that the courts intended to provoke a legislative or
administrative response. The courts' reactions can be interpreted plausibly
as traditional attempts to grapple with difficult areas of tort law in which
functional and normative considerations required changes. The examples
do, however, illustrate the types of political effects that tort rules can have.
Obviously, not all expansions of negligence liability will produce simi-
lar results. Nor is it always desirable for courts to stimulate legislative or
administrative response to a particular subject matter. The negative conse-
quences of the interim chaos that results when courts remove legal immu-
nities are legion. Transaction costs and the potential for a flood of litiga-
tion increase whenever courts adopt vague standards of care.""
The following Section analyzes the examples to determine what shared
characteristics led to the favorable political responses. By combining that
analysis with a realistic evaluation of the dangers inherent in employing
tort's political effects model, the Article attempts to set out criteria to gov-
ern its implementation.
B. Implementation of the Political Effects Model
Ideally, the political effects justification for tort liability leads to a stop-
gap legal principle. A new rule temporarily imposes liability upon a polit-
ically well-represented group. In response, the group is expected to acti-
vate legislative or administrative attention to the social problem
underlying the cases in which the rule applies. In the long run, the legis-
lature or executive agency will provide a solution and make the determi-
nation of who should bear the accident costs, and how.
Not all new liability decisions, however, will produce this idealized sce-
nario. The courts must thus identify guidelines for when political effect
considerations properly come into play.
163. In Defending the Environment, Professor Sax presents several case studies of major environ-
mental litigation. He concludes that the courts have "require[d] fuller and more open debate," J. SAX,
supra note 1, at 113, and helped "open the doors to a far more limber governmental process." Id. at
115; see also Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Interven-
tion, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 558 (1970).
164. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 81, at 479 (discussing standard of "reasonableness under all
the circumstances").
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1. The Nature of the Social Problem
In the three historical examples, plaintiffs continued to file cases despite
the existence of doctrines that seemed to preclude success.165 Recurring
litigation often highlights a social problem of significant magnitude.1"
Plaintiffs' persistence suggests, on the one hand, that the victims cannot
realistically avoid the dangerous activity167 and, on the other, that the un-
regulated market is neither reducing the risks nor providing adequate
compensation.
Such litigation thus signals a continuing, widespread need for relief. It
highlights an underlying social condition that may ultimately require leg-
islative, rather than judicial, solutions.1" 8 But the signal reaches only
judges. Imposing liability upon politically well-represented groups in turn
is judges' sole effective means to forward the message for legislative
consideration.16 9
These characteristics give rise to the first constraint upon judges who
would rely on political effects to justify a liability rule. Political considera-
tions are significant only in the context of persistent litigation prompted
by conditions that call for comprehensive remedies.170 Before a court at-
tempts to act as a political catalyst, the court should thus conclude that the
165. The contrast between American and European industrial accident and malpractice litigation
is striking. Europe, early on, regulated the railroad industry heavily. The need for malpractice litiga-
tion was reduced dramatically by national health insurance systems that automatically cared for in-
jured patients. Thus we see far fewer accidents and cases in Europe than in the United States, and
less need for legal doctrines to provoke the victim compensation schemes that have typified the Ameri-
can response.
166. The number and extent of injuries suffered by railroad workers and malpractice plaintiffs in
the early litigation periods, for example, was too high to reflect isolated incidents. See Friedman &
Ladinsky, supra note 101, at 60 (industrial accidents); H. LEwis & M. LEWis, THE MEDICAL OF-
FENDERS 25-26 (1970) (estimate that one medical practitioner in nine repeatedly violates professional
medical standards).
167. For example, railroad workers, needing jobs, continued to seek railroad employment. Pa-
tients, needing medical assistance, requested treatment despite the possibility of serious injury at the
hands of doctors. Environmental litigants had no option to avoid the pollution affecting them, since
defendants imposed the pollution in the regions which plaintiffs already inhabited.
168. See, e.g., Henderson, Judicial Review, supra note 80; Keeton, Creative Continuity in the
Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463 (1962) (comparing law-making competences of courts and
legislatures).
169. Institutional constraints generally limit courts to imposing liability or refusing to do so.
Courts have no authority to create a compromise liability scheme, such as workmen's compensation,
or to establish alternative mechanisms for dealing with societal problems, such as professional peer
review groups and environmental protection agencies. By shifting liability burdens, courts can, how-
ever, catalyze the legislature into seeking new solutions.
170. Courts can determine whether a widespread social problem exists by looking to the history of
the litigation, its nature, or social evidence and statistics. The assessments, however, are subject to
change. A "no-liability" judgment may initially be appropriate because the type of injury in question
appears unlikely to recur on a regular basis. That evaluation may later be proven wrong. The scope
of the problem itself may change. As time passes, societal and judicial perceptions of the social prob-
lem may also evolve, thus creating pressure to change the common law doctrine. Cf D. HOROWrrz,
supra note 97, at 295 (for purposes of reviewing established policy, "[1legislators may rely on interest
groups to rekindle their awareness").
The Politics of Torts
case before it stems from a social problem that legislators or administra-
tive regulators should ultimately resolve. 17
2. The Status of Extra-Judicial Consideration of the Problem
On the surface, it contradicts basic notions of judicial restraint to sug-
gest that judges should act, even occasionally, where other bodies are bet-
ter suited to decide an issue. 17 2 But the general prudential guidelines that
instruct courts to defer to legislative decision making13 assume that legis-
latures will act.174 The political effects model comes into play only where
that assumption rings false. The model is conceived precisely for situations
where a catalyst is needed to provoke legislative or administrative
attention. 75
This suggests a second constraint for judges who wish to justify a tort
rule on a political basis. In addition to evaluating the seriousness of the
social problem, the court must also evaluate the status of the problem in
the other fora. Is it being debated? Do forces currently exist which are
likely to frame the issue clearly, identify alternative solutions, and press
the fora to consider the issues seriously? If the legislature or an appropri-
171. In Whitney v. City of Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 366 N.E.2d 1210 (1977), the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court announced that it would retroactively redefine governmental tort immu-
nity if, and only if, the legislature failed to take action during its next session. The court hoped to
avoid short-term process costs inherent in changing the immunity, while still reaping the benefits of
catalyzing the legislature to act. Id. at 209-10, 366 N.E.2d at 1211-13; see also Spanel v. Mounds
View School District No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
The Whitney Court's decision making process, though sharing some goals and features with the
political effects model, differs in several significant respects. The political effects model adheres to the
traditional view that decisions should be framed in part by a court's need to decide an actual case.
Such concreteness forces judges to balance the effects of their decisions realistically and brakes any
tendency to adopt "imaginative" results that are not supported by substantive legal analysis. See infra
note 188 and accompanying text. In reaching only a tentative decision and offering it to the legislature
for review, the Whitney court did not bite the bullet. In effect, the court gave an advisory opinion. See
Comment, Prospective-Retroactive Overruling: Remanding Cases Pending Legislative Determina-
tions of Law, 58 B.U.L. REv. 818, 838 (1978).
Moreover, the Whitney Court's attempt to mold the ultimate legislative response raises serious sepa-
ration of power concerns. Under the political effects model, a court cannot interfere with the legisla-
ture's performance of its duties. The court may consider such factors as the societal need for and
likelihood of securing a legislative response, but it ordinarily will not even have a particular legislative
solution in mind. The legislature is perfectly free to perform its independent functions without fear of
judicial reprisal.
172. See, e.g., Diver, supra note 95.
173. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947) (noting "the necessity, if
government is to function constitutionally, for each [branch of government] to keep within its own
power, including the courts"); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-54 (Bran-
deis, J., concurring) (discussing "'great gravity and delicacy' of [the Court's] function in passing upon
the validity of an act of Congress").
174. See, e.g., Henderson, Judicial Review, supra note 80, at 1574.
175. See Peck, Comments, supra note 97, at 9 ("It is in areas of legislative inactivity that thejudiciary may safely perform a creative role."); cf Sax, supra note 163, at 558 ("The very fact that
sensitive courts perceive a need to reorient administrative conduct . . . suggests how insulated ...
agencies may be from the relevant constituencies.").
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ate regulatory body has already turned its attention to the "social prob-
lem" and given it adequate consideration 17-or is likely to do so without
judicial intervention-the court has no reason to act as a political catalyst.
If, on the other hand, the other branches of government appear dormant,
with no apparent intention of even contemplating the problem, the court
should be readier to intervene.
To understand this constraint, consider the example of the railroad ac-
cident litigation. Railroad accidents recurred,1 7 yet virtually no influen-
tial law-making body had addressed them. The railroad unions, perhaps
for lack of resources,1 78 had not picked up the gauntlet on behalf of vic-
tims. Most likely, union members did not even realize there was a battle
to be fought. Most private citizens, like the judges who initially adopted
the fellow-servant rule, accepted accidents as an inevitable burden of the
working man. Hence, as the vitality and wealth of the railroad industry
grew and undercut the initial rationales for immunity from suit, 17 1 the
legislatures still did not consider changing the balance to help workers
cope with the costs of accidents.
These circumstances might have justified shifting the burden of liability
onto defendants. As an historical matter, the prodding of the courts wak-
ened the principal actors-railroads, unions, and the legislatures-to the
core problem. The status of the issue in the legislature was, or should
have been, a focal consideration.
3. The Likely Political Effect of the Liability Doctrine
A related concern is the degree of political effect a court's new doctrine
is likely to have. As discussed above, the court that relies on the political
effects model should expect that other law-making bodies will ultimately
attend to the subject matter of the doctrine. The court must therefore hon-
estly assess the likelihood that its decision will be temporary. Any expan-
sion of liability has short term administrative and process costs.18 0 Should
176. If the issue has been debated in the past, the court should consider whether the underlying
problem and the abilities of the various parties to bear the burden of accident costs are substantially
the same as when the legislature last considered the issue.
177. See supra note 102.
178. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 101, at 74 ("Labor unions. . . were concerned with
more basic (and practical) issues such as wages and hours.").
179. See id. at 74. In the early days, courts concluded that employer liability would keep railroads
from developing or would put existing companies out of business. See authorities cited supra note 16.
Only as the railroad industry became secure did judges change their view of employers' legal rights
and duties. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 101, at 74. Requiring railroads to insure against
victim injury became a cost society could then afford.
180. Where, as in all three historical examples, the expansion comes through haphazard excep-
tions to accepted rules of law, the resulting legal chaos encourages costly litigation, skews potential
defendants' business judgments, and creates disparities in victim compensation. Even consistent,
across-the-board expansions of liability create transaction costs. For example, defendants must expend
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the legislature fail to react to the court's new rule, the rule and its costs
will endure."' 1 Thus, only a judge who realistically anticipates that his
solution will be a stopgap can accept the potentially adverse process conse-
quences of his remedy.
Judges, of course, cannot predict precisely how a legislature will act.
But they can assess a liability rule's usefulness as a catalyst, by evaluating
the political influence and capacity of the plaintiff and defendant groups.
Unless the class disadvantaged by a new liability doctrine is a cohesive
group with effective lobbying potential, the doctrine will have little politi-
cal effect. Railroads, doctors, and corporate polluters represented prime
political targets for the courts precisely because they were in a strong po-
sition to draw public and legislative attention to the courts' action. Con-
versely, a powerful, well-organized plaintiff group can seek legislative re-
dress on its own, without waiting for a liability rule to prod its adversary
into political action. 1 2
An equally important component to a liability rule's potential for politi-
cal effect is whether the legislature can do anything of substance once it
considers the social problem. If the court can conceive of no resolution
other than imposing the costs of accidents on the defendant class or the
plaintiff class, the court itself can make that choice as easily as the legisla-
ture.18 3 If, on the other hand, the court foresees compensation alternatives
or avenues the legislature might pursue to counteract the underlying cause
of injuries, the court can benefit society by making the issue public.
resources to adjust their activities to accommodate the risk of loss (e.g., in the case of commercial
enterprises, by purchasing insurance and spreading the cost of the premiums among their customers).
Insurers must recalculate their actuarial tables. Lawyers must retrain and adjust their practices.
Judges may need to realign their dockets.
181. The following pages encourage courts to rely upon societal factors not typically recognized in
case-sensitive litigation. To inform themselves regarding such criteria as the status of the issue in
other fora or the likelihood of a beneficial political response, see supra text accompanying notes
172-79, judges will have to adjust the way they determine facts. Numerous commentators have ad-
dressed the means by which courts can adjudicate "legislative facts." See, e.g., Karst, Legislative Facts
in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 75, 99-109; Note, Social and Economic
Facts-Appraisal of Suggested Techniques for Presenting Them to the Courts, 61 HARV. L. REv.
692 (1948). They have pointed out the practical difficulties inherent in this type of fact-finding. See,
e.g., Diver, supra note 95, at 95-99. Without belittling the problems courts will encounter, the work
of these commentators illustrates that means exist-including the use of expert testimony and sociolog-
ical research-through which courts can obtain the necessary information. Over time, judges and
attorneys will no doubt improve upon existing fact-finding techniques and develop new ways of gath-
ering data on the relevant societal factors.
182. See Sax, supra note 163, at 558, 560, 561; cf Peck, Comments, supra note 97, at 16, 18
(judicial activism appropriate in products liability area because consumers and patients are "not or-
ganized" and "channels of communication are not arranged in a manner that will bring them
together").
183. The court would base its actions on tort's substantive and process-related policies.
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4. The Indirect Effects of the Doctrine
Any expansion of liability to some degree affects the subsequent con-
duct of the parties and other members of society. It can also change soci-
ety's view of what is appropriate conduct."" As a consequence, doctrinal
shifts may on occasion have stronger political effects than merely drawing
attention to a problem. The changes in conduct and attitude may them-
selves alleviate the underlying problem and thereby ease the legislature's
task in arriving at an overall solution.
1 85
In the railroad context, for example, liability forced the railroads to
undertake safety measures. Knowing that an incentive toward safety ex-
isted, lawmakers could subsequently rest easier in limiting recoveries
achieved by injured workers through the workmen compensation scheme.
By the same token, malpractice liability sharply increased the practice of
preventive medicine and alerted consumers and insurers to the need to
take their own steps against negligent treatment. It therefore radically
changed the nature and scope of the problem with which the legislatures
had to deal. Nuisance law favorable to plaintiffs required industry to ac-
knowledge that pollution was a real cost of doing business, take steps
against pollution, and invest in research and development of anti-pollution
devices. Some consumers, having become more conscious of environmental
concerns, were prepared to boycott products of companies that refused.
These developments again facilitated the legislative response. Where, as in
these examples, a court can predict that a new legal doctrine will produce
a beneficial change in society's attitudes toward an important societal
problem, the balance shifts dramatically in favor of adopting the new
rule. 88
184. See Henderson, supra note 56, at 920.
185. As courts gain experience in adjudicating the merits of new categories of cases, the courts
may themselves develop ways of eliminating the process concerns that caused them to resist liability
initially. Professor Henderson describes one example relating to strict product liability. When courts
first breached the privity rules that had formerly prevented products liability litigation, the courts
adopted a negligence approach vehemently opposed by process scholars. With time and experience,
courts learned of the problems inherent in negligence litigation and looked for new means to cope.
Ultimately, strict liability-the mirror image of the initial no-duty immunity-developed. See Hen-
derson, supra note 56, at 927. While some scholars criticize that result, the change in doctrine un-
questionably reduced the courts' early process fears.
186. Professor Epstein cites workmen's compensation legislation as support for the proposition
that judicial action cannot bring about a result that would not otherwise occur. The statutory scheme,
he argues, "discarded the entire tort liability system . . . and started anew." Epstein, The Social
Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1717, 1738 (1982). That analysis ignores
the role judicial activism played in producing the new legislative result. Professor Epstein's basic
premise assumes that there is no value to speeding along a legislative solution and brushes aside the
importance of alleviating victim suffering in the interim. Professor Epstein also attaches no signifi-
cance to the attitude-changing effects of judicial decisions.
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5. The Merits
Each element of the political effects model discussed thus far assumes
that expanded liability is a stopgap reaction to a social problem, pending
ultimate legislative or administrative resolution. In reality, though, the
legislature may never act. The court therefore cannot justifiably create
doctrinal chaos simply in order to provoke a political response. It must be
prepared to live with the judicial rule on a long term basis.1 17
A judge's obligation to decide each case on its merits precludes use of
the model unless functional or normative tort policies support the outcome
of the case. 88 Only after identifying a substantive justification for liability
can a court-consistent with its adjudicative role-balance political con-
siderations against "non-substantive" process factors that favor an immu-
nity. As a practical matter, this constraint sharply limits the universe of
cases in which courts will even get to the stage of weighing the likelihood
of fruitful legislative action against the costs to society if the legislature
does not act.
6. Considerations that Minimize Process Concerns
Once a court reaches the point of balancing the political effect of a new
rule against countervailing process constraints, it may reasonably look to
factors that minimize the process costs of expanded liability. One factor
should be present in virtually every political effects case: The court's re-
sult is intended to be temporary. The court should be able to foresee a
time when the legislature will respond to the underlying causes of acci-
dents and eliminate the need for the judiciary to decide liability on a case-
by-case basis.
Other factors may exist. Where the new doctrine is confined to particu-
187. In the environmental litigation area, Professor Sax suggests that the courts have felt free to
protect the environment because enjoining polluting activity is usually a "tentative" decision which
can be overturned by the legislature. J. SAx, supra note 1, at 153, 175. Professor Sax thus concludes
that "[riather than being at odds with legislative policy-making, the courts are promoting that pro-
cess." Id. at 153; see id. at 157.
Whatever the merits of Professor Sax's view in the environmental cases he discusses, courts cannot
accept his premise as a universal truth. Various factors other than substance-including the defend-
ant's lack of access to the legislature and mere legislative inertia-may prevent a legislature from
considering particular issues.
188. Thus, under a functional approach, the court should not be willing to impose liability in a
category of cases unless, absent judicial intervention, serious market failures threaten the efficient
allocation of resources. In the railway accident, malpractice and environmental cases, market failures
may well have been present. Plaintiffs had insufficient information about the dangers of medical treat-
ment and railroad employment to make educated judgments. No effective market existed at all to
require environmental polluters to recognize the true cost of their activities.
Under a normative approach, corrective justice must be the initial justification for any liability rule.
"Fault" principles called for liability in the three historical examples; the defendants were directly
responsible for causing foreseeable injuries to plaintiffs. Until the courts changed the rules, however,
defendants received the benefits of "immunities," based on non-substantive, non-normative factors.
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lar categories of cases, the courts need not fear a flood of new litigation;
trial judges can halt litigation in other categories at the pleading stage. To
the extent a new negligence rule applies primarily in cases that do not
require juries to decide highly complex questions, 8 9 process concerns also
decrease. Finally, a new liability decision need not always encompass a
negligence approach. The less ambiguous the standard, the fewer the pro-
cess costs. As those disappear, the reasons to avoid an updated rule vanish
as well.190
C. The Trade-Off Between Political Effects and Process Costs
On the surface, reliance on political factors exceeds recognized bounda-
ries of judicial decisionmaking. Process reasoning, on the other hand,
seems to conform to "legitimate" exercise of judicial authority. Process
concerns emphasize traditional judicial "restraint," whereby courts admit
their limited competence and forestall the floods of litigation.
On closer inspection, though, the political effects and process models are
analogous approaches to the realities of negligence litigation. Both recom-
mend outcomes for reasons divorced from traditional "substantive" tort
theory. Both focus on the practical implications of liability rules for alter-
native decisionmakers 91
Historically, judges' use of the two approaches has largely been tacit.
Were courts to rely expressly on either type of reasoning, they would-to
be honest-have to make difficult factual assessments regarding the effects
of liability rules. Process justifications for tort immunity rest heavily on
empirical assumptions about the rationality of jury verdicts and their ef-
fect on private technology and resource-allocation decisions. The political
justification for a liability rule depends on the nature of the underlying
189. See supra note 85.
190. Professor Epstein hypothesizes that judge-made rules have no long term effects: If a law is
worth having, the legislature will eventually enact it. See supra note 186. Even accepting that the
legislature might at some point in the future have enacted workers' compensation or malpractice and
environmental regulation without the prodding of the courts, I suggest that courts served as a catalyst
for speedier change. They provided an incentive for political lobbies and legislatures to act and an
atmosphere in which new political solutions could result. During the period of attitudinal change, the
courts provided stopgap relief for victims who could not afford to wait. Relief was appropriate because
(1) there were legal/policy bases for compensation; (2) the doctrinal shifts themselves had beneficial
effects that facilitated the work of the non-judicial fora, and (3) in the short term, process costs were
not so high that society and the courts could not afford them. In the long term, even under Professor
Epstein's theory, a legislature could have overruled the judicial solutions if society had disapproved.
191. Political and process reasoning each react to the fact that courts are not fully qualified to
make decisions relating to technical or technological accident-prevention issues. Because process schol-
ars view negligence litigation as an inefficient and expensive form of regulation, they encourage courts
to leave questions of liability, compensation, and incentives to government regulators and technology
managers alone. The political effects model recognizes that an immunity rule may simply lead to
private and public inattention to a category of accidents. It thus attempts to provide incentives for
appropriate debate.
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social problem, the status of the legislative debate, and the ability of the
class of plaintiffs and defendants to focus public attention on the issues.
The factual determinations necessary to support implementation of the
two theories are equally problematic.
Moreover, both theories are "political." Courts exercise a political func-
tion implicitly whenever they use process considerations to create an im-
munity. In effect, the courts assume that if private decisionmakers do not
act appropriately, victims will influence public regulators to intervene.
Where the victim class is unorganized or unorganizable, however, the
pressure toward regulatory reform becomes negligible. The political im-
plications of a process immunity are therefore substantial, but hidden
from view.
Thus, courts are on similar footing when implementing political and
process reasoning. The difference between the two approaches lies not in
their legitimacy as judicial tools, but in their perspectives on social costs.
Political reasoning takes a long term view of societal benefits and costs;
process emphasizes present harms. The political effects model recognizes
that the benefits of inducing action in the appropriate forum may, in some
cases, outweigh the shorter-run process costs of adopting temporary liabil-
ity rules.192
We must recognize, of course, that no system of predicting the likeli-
hood and consequences of a legislative or administrative response is per-
fect. If a court's expectations of a favorable political reaction prove false,
the court will have adopted a rule that it should, judged retrospectively,
have rejected. The courts will have taken a calculated gamble and lost.193
192. Conceptually, it is relatively simple to compare the societal savings produced by a legislative
solution to a social problem against the transaction costs of negligence litigation. Quantifying and
offsetting the fairness concerns of process scholars is far more difficult.
A politically-based liability rule has theoretical side benefits that parallel a tort immunity's value in
enhancing the rule of law. In a different context, Professor Summers suggests that one of the factors
that makes a body of doctrine "good" is whether it involves participatory governance. Summers, Eval-
uating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4-5,
13-14, 20-21 (1974). Extending Professor Summers' observation somewhat, it is fair to conclude that
a legal rule increases in value if it serves to promote or enhance participatory governance, even at a
different time and in a different forum-that is, in the legislative process. See, e.g., J. SAX, supra note
1, at 113-14 ("courts exercise an overview designed to assure that democratic processes are made to
work and reflect the full range of public attitudes").
193. Arguably, any legislative response-even a simple failure to overturn the court's liability
decision-is preferable to a judicially-imposed immunity rule. The preference for a legislative decision
seems particularly strong where the character of the appropriate tort standard depends on practical
concerns-such as process consequences and the problem of crime-that are unrelated to traditional
substantive tort policies. Legislative inaction, however, can mean many things: for example, (1) lack of
interest in an issue or a belief that it is not sufficiently important to merit legislative attention, (2) log-
rolling, (3) disagreement with minor aspects of proposed legislation, and (4) fear of the political conse-
quences of action. See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAK-
ING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1395-96 (1958). While some courts have considered legislative si-
lence to be significant, see, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 315-16 (1947);
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 487-89 (1940), most have disclaimed its validity as a
The Yale Law Journal
The possibility of error should not, however, caution judges to avoid the
analysis. The political effects model comes into play only where, by defi-
nition, the need for a solution to the underlying social problem is great.
Despite the process costs, the strong substantive justifications for the lia-
bility rule suggest its adoption will generate some benefits. In addition,
courts are required to apply political reasoning so as to minimize process
concerns. Under these narrow circumstances, the courts will be able to live
with legislative inaction even though they might not, with hindsight, have
adopted the liability rule. Prudent judges retain the option of reversing or
changing the new liability system in the unlikely event that a court signif-
icantly miscalculates both the political effect of the liability rule"' and the
magnitude of the process costs.1 95
In short, the potential benefits of judicial activism based on political
reasoning outweigh the risks. Courts should not focus so exclusively on
process that they ignore the positive long term political effects tort doctrine
can have.
III. THE POLITICAL EFFECTS MODEL AND NEGLIGENT SECURITY
LITIGATION
A. In General
If there is any group of current decisions in which the political effects
model seems to be at work, it is the area of negligent security law. Unspo-
ken process fears have held many judges back from recognizing a cause of
action. Other judges, for their own unexpressed reasons, have looked past
the process consequences and acknowledged a cause of action. This Sec-
reliable indication of legislative intent, see, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 47
(1950); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-121 (1940). Under either view, in order to draw any
inference from legislative silence, it is necessary to presuppose that the legislature has considered the
issues fully before deciding not to act. See, e.g., Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 331
U.S. 17, 25-26 (1947); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 15 (1941).
194. A court should be able to predict legislative responsiveness fairly accurately. If the court can
identify compelling moral or instrumental arguments supporting a liability rule, it knows the legisla-
ture had strong reason to act when the courts did not. The legislature's inaction can only be attributed
to the lack of a political stimulus. By imposing liability on the politically powerful group, the court
should cause this barrier to disappear.
Moreover, once the court creates a right to sue, all the relevant actors may well favor a legislative
remedy. As the workers' compensation example shows, potential victims will often join liable institu-
tional defendants in seeking a rational comprehensive system governing accident costs. See supra text
accompanying notes 117-18. The legislature is unlikely to remain silent where all the affected parties
coalesce and demand a legislative resolution.
195. The political effects model justifies liability most readily where the court believes that the
substantive theoretical support for liability is only barely outweighed by process concerns. See supra
text accompanying notes 187-88. Political reasoning will thus bring about a disastrous result only
where the court underestimates (1) the likelihood of legislative action, (2) the strength of the substan-
tive support for liability, and (3) the moderate process consequences of a liability rule. If the court
assesses any of these three factors correctly, the resulting liability rule should be tolerable even if the
legislature ultimately fails to act.
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tion argues that tort's political effects are, or should be, the justification
for the modern approach."" 6
1. The Problem and the Substantive Background
The two major prerequisites to implementation of the political effects
model are present in the negligent security context. First, as we have al-
ready seen, liability is consistent with substantive tort theory.1 97 Second,
negligent security litigation clearly reflects a widespread social problem:
violent street crime and the need to protect potential and actual victims.
The crime rate has surged over the past two decades.19 8 The incidence
of crime has remained greatest in urban areas,199 particularly commercial-
ized neighborhoods. Absent adequate public law enforcement, only two
sets of actors are in a position to do something about the recurring acci-
dents. Enterprises that attract criminals can take security measures. Citi-
zens themselves can refrain from walking in the streets or approaching
commercial enterprises near whose property crimes occur. Enterprises,
however, have no incentive to take the needed steps, while citizens have
thus far refused to hibernate. 00 It is therefore not surprising that negli-
gent security victims continue to bring cases.
Under modern negligence theory, we would have expected tort law to
196. This Article takes no position on how courts should reconcile process considerations with
countervailing substantive arguments in the absence of any likely political effect. In other words, if
process costs of a liability rule are high, the merits favor liability, but tort's political effects do not
come into play, the courts must resolve the issue on the basis of independent criteria.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 34-79.
198. The FBI's estimate of total indexed offenses has risen, from approximately 2.3 million in
1963 to 12.9 million in 1982. Compare FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 40 (1982) with FBI, UNI-
FORM CRIME REPORTS 2 (1963). Notwithstanding changes in statistical reporting and growth in the
U.S. population, the figures still reflect significant increases. Crimes designed to garner financial re-
ward-robbery, burglary, and larceny-increased their share of total crime from 75% to 86%. It is
this category that is most relevant to negligent security defendants, whose enterprises attract profit-
oriented crime.
199. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 13 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as JUSTICE REPORT]; see also RESEARCH & FORECASTS, INC., THE FIGCIE RE-
PORT ON FEAR OF CRIME: AMERICA AFRAID 31 (1980) (fear of crime higher in large cities than
elsewhere).
200. Perhaps even more than in the railroad, malpractice, and environmental litigation contexts,
negligent security plaintiffs are unlikely to abandon the activities which give rise to their injuries.
They must live somewhere, so they cannot avoid approaching apartment buildings. They must shop
for food and use stores and banks.
Plaintiffs may consider the location of commercial enterprises in choosing which to frequent. But
convenience and proximity to home or work, rather than store security, are generally their first con-
cerns. Moreover, most commercial areas in large cities present substantial danger of crime. While the
investment of commercial enterprises in safety precautions varies dramatically, customers draw little
distinction among similar areas and stores of relatively equal prominence. While a strict cost-benefit
analysis might in theory cause consumers to be more selective on the basis of the danger of crime, few
have enough information or inclination to make more than a broad choice. They are thus likely to
continue to engage in dangerous activity despite the risk.
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develop so as to encourage crime prevention by businesses.201 Courts have
not, however, consistently adopted this approach. The persistence of negli-
gent security litigation in the face of the existing doctrinal obstacles to suit
suggests that there is, nonetheless, social pressure towards a change in the
law.
2. The Status of Extra-Judicial Consideration
Despite the substantial increase in crime, federal and state governments
have been slow to respond innovatively. 202 Public expenditures on crime
control have not kept pace with the incidence of crime.2 0 Recent initia-
tives have focused almost exclusively upon increasing sentences, eliminat-
ing civil liberties of criminal defendants, and making parole more diffi-
cult.204 The public's concern over the problem of crime, though vocal, has
not translated into new programs designed to prevent or eliminate crime
before it occurs.205 Rather, like in the workers' compensation context, leg-
islatures and citizens alike have tended to accept the risk of crime as an
inevitable burden of city life. Absent some reason to focus on alternative
solutions, the legislatures are unlikely to adopt any new approach.
3. The Direct Political Effects of Negligent Security Liability
Imposing liability on commercial enterprises such as landlords, hotels,
stores, and banks is likely to induce the formation of coalitions and to
focus public attention upon the social crisis. Individual victims can at-
tempt to raise a political hue and cry, but rarely will they have the re-
sources, organization, and expertise required for a sustained lobbying ef-
fort or media campaign. Commercial enterprises confronted with liability,
by contrast, can find each other. If the threat is substantial enough, they
are in a position to allocate resources for the purpose of exerting their
political sway.208 Merchant groups can thus, in theory, be a catalyst for
legislative action.
201. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
202. To take a prominent example, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, a federal
agency organized in 1968 for the specific purpose of "assist[ing] state and local governments in reduc-
ing the incidence of crime," 42 U.S.C. §§ 3711 (c)(2), 3721 (1968), immediately devoted the bulk of its
funds to traditional police protection mechanisms. See LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN.,
SAFE STREETS . . . THE LEAA PROGRAM AT WORK 7 (1971).
203. Government spending for police protection rose less than 70% between 1960 and 1980. Jus-
TICE REPORT, supra note 199, at 100.
204. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE, VICTIMS OF CRIME 17-18 (1982).
205. A few jurisdictions have implemented community action programs that appear to be success-
ful, see infra note 211, but which have not received much publicity or emulation in other localities.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 217 (1982).
206. Little empirical research exists on the effect of lobbying by various interest groups on crime
legislation. One recent study, however, shows that while hundreds of groups, including "victim orga-
nizations," were concerned with the enactment of the new federal criminal code, only a few influenced
Vol. 95: 698, 1986
The Politics of Torts
Nevertheless, the options available to redress the problem are not obvi-
ous. Legislatures have already devoted substantial resources to crime-
related subjects. They have not, in the end, arrived at any imaginative
solutions to the underlying problems of crime and crime-victimization.
Yet unexplored avenues do, in fact, exist. Alternative approaches in-
clude public training of private security forces,207 cooperative efforts be-
tween police and neighborhood security planners, 08 well-defined, specific
safety regulations aimed at security,209 tax benefits for crime-prevention
measures, 2 1 and victim education programs..2 " Any of these remedies can,
of course, be coupled with victim compensation systems designed to mini-
mize the transaction costs of case-by-case negligent security litigation.2"'
Whatever the merits of these or other programs,21 3 it is clear that
countless compromise responses to the crime phenomenon have yet to be
evaluated. Arguably, though, judicial action may be unnecessary to goad
the ultimate reform. Other than government agencies and lawyers' organizations, the most influential
groups appear to have been business coalitions and labor. See Stolz, Interest Groups and Criminal
Law: The Case of Federal Criminal Code Revision, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 91, 95-96 (1984).
207. Such patrols may be more effective than increased police staffs. Officers can be trained to
recognize and respond to the needs of individual commercial areas, and resources can be devoted to
tailored crime prevention programs. Local merchants benefitting from the patrols can, in theory, be
required to provide financial support.
208. Police might, for example, establish floating "safety zones" for pedestrians, in which the
police would provide intensive protection. These zones could "float," at different times, to different
sections of particular commercial areas. Legislatures might enhance their effect by imposing staggered
operating hours for enterprises within the different sections of any given community. Similarly, by
establishing uniform standards for burglar alarms-including frequencies and reporting proce-
dures-a legislature could probably make it easier for police to respond to alarms and reduce the price
of the alarms for the business community (e.g., by reducing production and marketing costs).
209. See supra note 25 (discussing the safety aspects of New Jersey housing code).
210. Cf 26 U.S.C.A. § 23 (West Supp. 1985) (federal tax credit for installation of energy-saving
devices).
211. Crime avoidance education techniques, such as publicizing local crime statistics or requiring
commercial enterprises to warn customers of a history of crime in the neighborhood, might be useful.
Legislatures can also require potential crime victims to take safety precautions, such as carrying police
whistles and participating in escort programs. Cf N.Y. VE-. & TRAF. LAW § 1229-c (Consol. Supp.
1985) (requiring automobile passengers to wear seatbelts). The limited information that exists sug-
gests that the participation of untrained citizens in crime watch programs has also been effective. See,
e.g., NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION AND THE LOCAL OFFICIAL 6
(statement of Patrick Murphy); RESEARCH & FORECASTS, INC., supra note 199, at 2-3, 5-10, 23-62;
see also Crime Stopper TV Programs Report Major Success, CRIM. J. NEwSLETTER, Sept. 17, 1984,
at 2.
212. Options include the imposition of liability caps, use of compensation boards, and adoption of
a statutory standard of care. See Carrington & Nicholson, The Victims' Movement: An Idea Whose
Time has Come, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. (SYMPosIuM) 1, 2 (1984) (39 states, D.C., and Virgin
Islands have adopted some form of victim compensation statute).
Requiring enterprises to fund such programs, as in the workers' compensation realm, would give
business as a whole an incentive to develop new protective measures. A particular scheme, including
any compensation "cap," might also in theory be conditioned on adequate security by individual busi-
nesses. These conditions would enhance incentives for crime prevention.
213. Of course, radical new approaches exist as well. See N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE
HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL (1969); Michalowski, Crime Control in the
1980's: A Progressive Agenda, CRIME & SoC. JUST. 13 (Summer 1983). A few states have imple-
mented innovative programs. See RESEARCH & FORECASTS, INC., supra note 199, at 10-18, 79-131.
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legislatures to consider the alternatives. Crime is, after all, a visible public
issue."" The victim class, while perhaps disorganized and under-
represented, is not totally without voice.215 Some legislatures have consid-
ered victim compensation schemes without the prodding of any judicial
spur.21
Yet careful analysis suggests that imposing liability on merchant groups
is likely to hasten the legislative reaction and change the character of the
political response. Because of the prevailing attitude that crime prevention
is solely a public concern, victim lobbyists generally call for backward-
looking legislation such as public victim compensation.2 11 A liability rule
will force merchants to participate in the public debate and, for the first
time, accept compromise solutions that impose some responsibility on
them. Commercial lobbyists seeking to avoid liability and litigation costs,
unlike victims, have little hope of securing a direct public subsidy. Their
legislative proposals will thus, of political necessity, be coupled with for-
ward-looking provisions directed at the underlying problems of crime and
crime-prevention.218
We cannot accurately predict the end result of authorizing negligent
security liability. A legislature may quickly implement new solutions. The
courts may over time discover alternative means to implement the substan-
tive tort policies at lower process costs.2 19 On the other hand, the legisla-
214. Crime is a focus of media attention and the issue has been part of every presidential platform
in recent memory. See, e.g., Ferraro Pledges Federal Aid for Model Crime Control Plans, CRIM. J.
NEWSLETER, Sept. 17, 1984, at 2 (Reagan/Mondale campaign); N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1980, at 9,
col. 1 (Reagan/Carter campaign); N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1976, at 1, col. 2 (Carter/Ford campaign);
N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1972, at 35, col. 5 (Nixon/McGovern campaign); N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1968,
§ 4, at 10, col. 1 (Nixon/Humphrey campaign); NATIONAL LEAGuE OF CITIES, supra note 211, at 8
(statement of Patrick Murphy, discussing Johnson/Goldwater campaign).
215. There has been a "virtual explosion of interest" in victims' rights in the past five years and a
flurry of new victims' rights statutes. Hudson, The Crime Victim and the Criminal Justice System:
Time for a Change, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. (SYMPOSIUM) 23, 26 (1984); see also N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§§ 622, 623 (McKinney 1982) (establishing Crime Victims Board to administer all state programs
dealing with crime victims and, inter alia, actively to advocate rights and interests of crime victims
before other units of government). The Omnibus Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982), received bipartisan support in both houses. See Carrington &
Nicholson, supra note 212, at 8.
216. In Oklahoma, for example, the Oklahoma District Attorneys Association sponsored legisla-
tion. See Turpen, The Criminal Injustice System: An Overview of the Oklahoma Victims' Bill of
Rights, 17 TuLSA L.J. 253 (1981).
217. Cf Peck, Comments, supra note 97, at 16 (victims of defective products seek compensation
for their injuries instead of forward-looking deterrent remedies). For examples of crime victim com-
pensation statutes, see O'Neill, The Good, the Bad, and the Burger Court: Victims' Rights and a
New Model of Criminal Review, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 363, 370 n.31 (1984). Commercial
enterprises, in contrast, have a continuing interest in resolving the underlying causes of accidents for
which they must pay.
218. See infra text accompanying notes 224-27.
219. See supra note 185. One of the goals of courts concerned about process is to define a man-
ageable standard for determining liability. After experiencing litigation for a period of time, courts are
often better able to define "compensable events," that is, actions or situations that merit liability. See
generally ABA COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTIcE LIABiLrry, supra note 121 (discussing ABA
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ture may not be able to develop an enlightened response. It may simply
return tort law to its previous state220 or allow negligent security litigation
to continue.221 Over time, the courts will have to deal with the process
consequences.
The bottom line, however, is that courts can cope with the uncertainty
engendered by limited categories 222 of negligent security litigation. 223 The
potential reward inherent in legislative consideration of crime-prevention
must be weighed against the danger that the legislature will not act. Judi-
cial risk averseness alone does not justify ignoring the political effects that
tort doctrine can have.
4. The Indirect Effect of the Doctrine
For several reasons, opening the door to negligent security liability will
assist legislatures in dealing with crime. First, it is likely to expand the
number of legislative responses that are politically feasible. Second, the
liability doctrine's effect on attitudes may itself alleviate the problem of
crime prevention and thereby facilitate the legislatures' task of finding a
workable alternative.
a. Industry's Willingness to Accept Alternative Rules
Galvanizing potential defendants into pursuing the political process
does more than merely bring issues to public attention. In the railroad
injury example, new judicial doctrines forced the railroads to realize that
efforts to define compensable events in medical malpractice litigation).
220. It is important to recognize that the goal of the political effects model is not necessarily to
maintain long-term liability rules favoring plaintiffs. For example, legislatures that abrogated mal-
practice litigation in response to new liability rules, see supra text accompanying notes 141-43, acted
consistently with the model's predicted scenario. The new laws are the product of full legislative
consideration. They take into account, and sometimes implement, alternative private and regulatory
protections for potential malpractice victims. Though in the end negligence liability may be as limited
as under a process-based immunity rule, imposing liability initially still had political effects that may
have benefitted society.
221. Legislatures and administrators, though, may have problems "putting the genie back in thebottle." In the malpractice area, for example, some courts struck down as unconstitutional legislative
decisions to bar malpractice suits. See Neubauer & Henke, supra note 137, at 64-65. A court that
relies on the political effects model must thus carefully evaluate the range of the permissible legislative
response, including the potential scope of the legislature's authority.
222. It is important to remember that courts will use tort's political function to authorize negli-
gent security litigation only in strictly confined categories of cases. See supra note 188 and accompa-
nying text.
223. There are, of course, many ways in which the courts can react, including reversing a rule
that proves unworkable. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985).
Once courts impose liability, however, they will probably hesitate to recant even after the legislature
reveals its intention not to act.
Judges can, however, take steps other than reversing themselves. They can change the liability rule
to limit process concerns, or they can reevaluate the doctrine. They may determine that process con-
cerns have not proven to be as dire as they initially predicted and hold that the liability rule should
remain on the books.
The Yale Law Journal
they would have to share in the burden of industrial accidents. Medical
malpractice liability encouraged the profession to volunteer to adopt reme-
dies such as peer review groups and compulsory arbitration. Nuisance liti-
gation led polluting industries to accept their responsibility to take account
of environmental concerns.
The negligent security situation is strikingly similar. As the law stands,
commercial defendants have no reason to accept any solution which would
burden them. Victims want change, but enterprises prefer the status quo.
Thus we find that most of the legislative solutions to crime victimization
proposed in the absence of enterprisal liability focus exclusively on public
compensation for victims. 24 This approach has serious flaws. Purely pub-
lic compensation alone provides no incentives to eliminate the underlying
crime problem.22 5 Only the defendant class is in a position to take effective
security measures. 26 Public expenditures available for crime control are
finite and have already proven inadequate to the task.22 For each of these
reasons, any workable solution is likely to require the involvement of the
private sector and private resources. The examples of industrial accident,
malpractice, and environmental litigation suggest that imposing liability
on merchants for negligent security may well bring about such involve-
ment. Without the political catalyst of tort liability, the regulatory solu-
tions obvious and available to the legislatures are likely to remain drasti-
cally confined.
b. Society's View of Private Responsibility for Crime Prevention
In each of the industrial accident, malpractice, and environmental con-
texts, the doctrinal shift itself had beneficial effects on contemporary atti-
tudes. Railroads began to take safety precautions; unions and politicians
became sensitized to the incidence and seriousness of industrial accidents.
Doctors began to take preventive steps to avoid malpractice; consumer
awareness was enhanced. Industry took steps against pollution and in-
vested in anti-pollution research; consumer groups grew, became active,
and began to demand private environmental initiatives. Not only did the
new liability rules draw attention to the underlying social problems, but
they both eased the problems themselves and created an atmosphere in
which legislative or administrative initiative became simpler and more re-
224. See Jones, The Costs of Victim Compensation, in THE COSTS OF CRIME, supra note 38, at
123; Note, Compensating the Victims of Crime: Evolving Concept or Dying Theory, 82 W. VA. L.
REv. 89, 107-08 (1982).
225. See Harland, Compensating the Victims of Crime, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 203, 224 (1978).
226. See supra note 70.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 203-05.
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alistic. Negligent security liability can, in this respect, play its most dra-
matic role.
One of the defects of the rule that private actors have no affirmative
obligation to protect others from third-party criminal attack is that the
rule sets a moral standard. 218 It creates a sense that citizens need not "get
involved, 229 thus reinforcing their natural inclination to avoid responsi-
bility for the well-being of the public-at-large.2 3 0 Legally private parties
currently have nothing to fear when they refrain from acting.2 1 If they do
undertake protective measures, the law subjects them to the risk of liabil-
ity for negligence. 2 2 As a result, private parties generally avoid "involve-
ment." Their refusal even to cooperate with the police is often cited as a
primary factor in the current ineffectiveness of law enforcement.2"'
Imposing negligent security liability cannot, in and of itself, eliminate
inaction in the private sector. But at a minimum, it informs commercial
enterprises that they must become somewhat involved in crime prevention.
More generally, the recognition of a duty to protect third parties would
"enhance the perceived desirability '2 "4 of taking steps to secure the safety
of others.2 5 A liability rule would "decrease the ambiguity of the current
law by providing a norm, or prescription of appropriate conduct.2 23 6
Empirical research suggests that establishing legal norms would also
encourage negligent security defendants to protect potential victims for a
228. D'Amato, The "Bad Samaritan" Paradigm, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 800, 809 (1975) ("Legal
and moral rules are in symbiotic relationship; one 'learns' what is moral by observing what other
people . . . tend to enforce.").
229. See, e.g., A. BIDERMAN, L. JOHNSON, J. MCINTYRE, & A. WEIR, REPORT ON A PILOTSTUDY IN THE DISTRIr OF COLUMBIA ON VICTIMIZATION AND ATrTUDES TOWARD LAW EN-
FORCEMENT 154-58 (1967).
230. As the media publicizes incidents in which private actors have acted on their "inclination"
not to get involved, the resulting increase in fear of crime feeds the syndrome. In the now famousKitty Genovese case, for example, thirty-eight witnesses to a brutal assault and murder stood by and
did nothing. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1964, at 1, col. 4. A year later, after heavy publicity of the
events, the witnesses "still did not see why they should have acted." N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1965, at
35, col. 6.
231. See Rudolph, The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule, 44 NEB. L. REV. 499, 502 (1965).232. See, e.g., Devlin v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 235 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); see also Ru-
dolph, supra note 231, at 510. ("Of all persons, the volunteer is the least protected by the law. He
seems always to be treated as an officious intermeddler.").
233. See A. BIDERMAN, L. JOHNSON, J. MCINTYRE, & A. WEIR, supra note 229, at 151-57; see
also CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 46, at 25-26, 31-33 and sources cited therein; Goldstein,
Citizen Cooperation: The Perspective of the Police, in RATCLIFFE, supra note 61, at 199, 201; Note,
supra note 61, at 1787.
234. Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 51, 58 (1972).
235. See Waller, Rescue and the Common Law: England and Australia, in RATCLIFFE, supra
note 61, at 141 (liability would serve "to teach . . . the canons of right and wrong to the commu-
nity"); Rudolph, supra note 231, at 536-37 (a liability rule can "create an environment in which [the
individual] could be a better citizen").
236. Note, The Duty to Rescue in Tort Law: Implications of Research on Altruism, 55 IND. L.J.551, 561 (1980). The new standard of care must, of course, be clear and applied even-handedly if it is
to shift attitudes. In order to have the desired effect, the first instances of imposition of liability must
also be well publicized. Without knowledge of the standard, citizens cannot be educated by it.
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variety of psychological reasons.2 37 The breakdown of the syndrome of "I
don't want to get involved" in the negligent security context can change
the public and legislative views of the need to cooperate with law enforce-
ment authorities in other contexts as well.238
If negligent security liability has an impact in creating an atmosphere
in which plaintiffs, defendants, and observers sense some responsibility for
each others' safety from crime, any disadvantages of liability will, by com-
parison, become far less significant.2" 9 The tort vehicle should, in the
short run, promote precisely this type of "morality."2 O4 Ultimately the
shift in attitudes is likely to ease the legislature's task in finding a perma-
nent solution to the problem of crime prevention as a whole.
B. Applications of Negligent Security Liability
Both for "substantive" and "political" reasons, different negligent se-
curity fact patterns may call for different conclusions on liability.241 A
237. Most of the research has been conducted in the bystander rescue context. See generally Note,
supra note 61, at 1788-91 (canvassing and discussing empirical research). One study illustrates that
where the law imposes a limited duty to prevent injury to an endangered person, the party in a
position to aid is likely to perceive a general moral responsibility to protect victims. See Kaufman,
Legality and Harmfulness of a Bystander's Failure to Intervene as Determinants of Moral Judg-
ment, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR 77 (J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz eds. 1970); see also
Zeisel, An International Experiment on the Effects of a Good Samaritan Law, in RATCLIFFE, supra
note 61, at 209, 211 (citizens of countries that legally require bystander rescue take far stronger moral
position that private parties should "get involved").
It has also been established empirically that private parties' perceptions of the need for their in-
volvement to protect victims is affected by both legal requirements and the degree to which other
private parties get involved. In one survey, "bystander[s] [were] led by the apparent lack of concern of
the others to interpret the situation as being less serious than [they] would [have] if alone." Latani &
Darley, Bystander "Apathy," 57 AM. ScIENTIsT 244, 265 (1969) (emphasis in original). "The results
of these experiments suggestled] that social inhibition effects may be rather general over a wide variety
of emergency situations." Id. at 266.
238. Cf Note, supra note 236, at 560 ("On the basis of attribution research, it can be predicted
that if people were to become aware of a legal duty to aid another, and if ... they were to behave
consistently with this legal duty, they would eventually come to believe in the duty to aid.").
239. To the extent negligent security litigation teaches citizens that methods for crime prevention
exist, it may also be valuable. For example, a recent national study showed 81% of citizens surveyed
were "interested in joining" a neighborhood crime watch program. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 218 (1982). Only 17% could say that such a pro-
gram existed in their neighborhood. Id. at 217.
240. See Rudzinski, The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis, in RATCLIFFE, supra note 61,
at 122; Tune, The Volunteer and the Good Samaritan, in RATCLIFFE, supra note 61, at 43, 56-62;
see also, Gusfield, Social Sources of Levites and Samaritans, in RATcLIFFE, supra note 61, 183, 196
("The very passage of a law is an act of public definition of what is moral or immoral."); Note, supra
note 236, at 560 ("it may be that morals can be legislated, that our laws can make us better"). But see
Selvin, supra note 13, at 318, in which the author, based on meager evidence, concludes that the
Kline decision has had little impact upon the actions of landlords.
241. For example, functional analysis suggests that the more a class of potential victims knows of
the danger and can avoid it, the less the need to protect the class by judicial means. The greater the
role safety plays in customers' decisions to patronize a commercial enterprise, the greater the existing
economic incentive for the enterprises to take preventive measures and to bring the problem of crime
in the neighborhood to the attention of governmental decision-makers.
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review of actual and hypothetical cases illustrates the variety of results a
court might reach.242 This brief and tentative examination of the litigation
also shows how process consequences of the political function can be mini-
mized by a careful category-by-category approach.
1. The Landlord-Tenant Case243
A tenant of a metropolitan apartment building is raped in thelobby. Crime in the neighborhood has been on the rise and pre-
vious incidents have occurred in the public areas of the
building.
As seen in the analysis of Kline, there are strong functional and norma-
tive justifications for imposing liability on landlords.244 From a political
perspective, the problem of street crime in our residential neighborhoods
calls for new solutions. Placing the burden of liability on landlords may
help to find and implement these solutions. 45 In the absence of a change
in tort law, it is difficult to imagine incentives that will encourage the
ordinary legislative and administrative processes to provide a solution. It
seems, therefore, that the D.C. Court of Appeals in Kline reached an ap-
propriate result, consistent with political effects criteria.
242. Because the substantive justifications for negligent security and bystander-rescue liability dif-fer radically, see supra text accompanying notes 61-66, this Article does not consider good samaritan
cases as a subset of negligent security litigation. The political effects model would, in any event, notjustify bystander liability. Few legislative alternatives for minimizing the root cause of good samaritan
cases come to mind. Even if new solutions are available, imposing tort liability on bystanders who failto rescue is unlikely to bring about legislative consideration; citizen/bystanders have no more political
clout than victims. Liability would therefore not serve the political effects model's purpose.
243. Despite limited success in the courts, tenants continue to file negligent security lawsuits
against landlords. See, e.g., Carrigan v. New World Enters., 112 I1. App. 3d 970, 446 N.E.2d 265(1983); cf. Childers v. LOW Apartments, 214 Neb. 291, 333 N.W.2d 677 (1983) (court does not
reach issue of negligent security and jury finds no liability); Shepard v. Drucker & Falk, 63 N.C.App. 667, 306 S.E.2d 199 (1983) (judgment entered for landlord). Since Kline, more claims have goneto the jury and many have been successful. See, e.g., Cain v. Vontz, 703 F.2d 1279, 1282-83 (11thCir. 1983) (failure to repair locks on apartment door); Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc.,393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975) (failure to take safety precautions); Johnston v. Harris, 387Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972) (failure to provide adequate lighting and locks); Braitman v.Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975) (failure to repair locks); Knapp v. Wilson,535 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Cf. Yost v. Monte Vista Apartments, Inc., 26 A.T.L.A. L.REP. 31 (Philadelphia County. C. of C. P. July 14, 1983) ($112,500 settlement). This no doubt
reflects the existence of some favorable precedent, the recurring and serious nature of the victims'injuries, and the fact that the landlord-tenant relationship is one that seems ripe for judicial
restructuring.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 44-55, 62-79.
245. See Peck, Comments, supra note 97, at 21 (referring to "the experienced lobbyists for...
apartment-house operators").
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2. The Hotel Case""6
A hotel guest is shot to death in front of the entrance of afash-
ionable hotel. Previous crimes have been reported in the
neighborhood.
The hotel guest/victim context directly parallels Kline, but in a setting
where the functional justifications for liability are even stronger.147 Hotel
owners are as knowledgeable as residential landlords about the relevant
crime risks and costs of prevention. Hotel crime victims are even more
helpless than residential tenants, because they are in an unfamiliar place,
among strangers. Hotel guests are less able to learn of danger or of meth-
ods for protecting themselves. They are not sufficiently familiar with other
potential victims that they can, even in theory, arrange a collective bargain
with hotel-keepers regarding security.
Hotel guests are neither an organized nor an organizable political force
that could push for legislative solutions. Lacking an apparent common
ground-geographic, economic, social or otherwise-the class of "guests"
will have difficulty exchanging information, selecting leaders, and devel-
oping new ideas. The only way guests can effectively signal a need for
redress is through individual lawsuits. Given the substantive basis for rec-
ognizing their right to sue, a court might appropriately choose to pass the
signal on to the legislature, by authorizing the litigation.
3. The Store/Parking Lot Case248
A store customer is robbed and injured at night in the parking
lot. Security experts testify that the parking lot is inadequately
lit and that the store is in a high crime area.
246. In number, negligent security lawsuits involving injured hotel guests are second only to land-
lord-tenant cases. They reach the jury and win more frequently. See, e.g., Banks v. Hyatt Corp., 722
F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1984); Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. Robbins, 433 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1983);
Virginia D. v. Madesco Inv. Corp., 648 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. 1983) (en bane). Some courts, however,
make it difficult for plaintiffs to succeed. See, e.g., Courtney v. Remler, 566 F. Supp. 1225 (D.S.C.
1983); Kveragas v. Scottish Inns, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. Tenn. 1983).
247. Usually, hotel crime victims rely upon the traditional "special relationship" theory under
which the common law imposed a high duty of care upon innkeepers towards their guests. See supra
note 19; see also Orlando Executive Park Inc. v. Robbins, 433 So. 2d 491, 493 (Fla. 1983) (citing
cases); Virginia D. v. Madesco Inv. Corp., 648 S.W.2d 881, 885-86 (Mo. 1983) (en bane); ef.
Courtney v. Remler, 566 F. Supp. 1225, 1233-34 (D.S.C. 1983) (landlord acted reasonably). A few
courts, however, have abandoned this distinction and held that hotel liability is appropriate under
general negligent security principles. See, e.g., Banks v. Hyatt Corp., 722 F.2d 214, 226 (5th Cir.
1984) ("We find this limitation [of innkeepers' duties] to be an artificial legal boundary, and decline
to adopt it."); Morrison v. MGM Grand Hotel, 570 F. Supp. 1449, 1451 (D. Nev. 1983); cf. Kvera-
gas v. Scottish Inns, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 258, 259 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) (restrictive negligent security
rules apply equally to innkeepers and other defendant motel operators).
248. As they move from Kline-type settings or cases formerly falling within the innkeeper rules,
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Storeowners, like landlords, 24 9 are well-situated to learn of crimes
against patrons on their property, take preventive measures, or self-insure.
They can spread the cost of security and insurance.
A functional analysis, however, might treat store customers less favora-
bly than tenants. Unlike tenants, for whom security may only be one of
many considerations in signing a lease,250 customers of an urban merchant
usually have a meaningful choice to shop elsewhere. We would ordinarily
not expect a consumer to put his life in danger in order to buy cheaper or
better merchandise. If customers indeed choose to frequent safer stores,
then the free market is working. The potential loss of patronage gives
stores an appropriate incentive to take security measures, without any ju-
dicial prodding.
Yet customers may not be as mobile as this analysis assumes.2 1 More-
over, storeowners have superior knowledge of specific dangers near spe-
cific stores, contrasted with customers' awareness of at most a general
danger in the area. Even a functional approach may thus justify
liability.25
2
Strong normative justifications in any event call into question the in-
strumental view that customers "assume the risk" of crime where they
reside and shop. The stores attract additional crime. To the extent the
store increases the risk, there may be substantive moral reasons to require
increased security.
Whether the political effects model can be used to bolster the substan-
tive justifications in any category of "store/parking lot" case depends on
many factors. Small businesses are generally well-organized and able to
courts become wary of imposing liability. See, e.g., Meadows v. Friedman R.R. Salvage Warehouse,655 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Mo. App. 1983); Atamian v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 146 N.J. Super. 149,154, 369 A.2d 38, 41 (1976). Numerous courts have precluded store liability by strictly applyingforeseeability rules. See, e.g., Latham v. Aronov Realty Co., 435 So. 2d 209, 214 (Ala. 1983); Cook v.Safeway Stores, Inc., 354 A.2d 507 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976); Taylor v. Dixon, 8 Ohio App. 3d 161, 456N.E.2d 558 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848 (1983). Yet claims involving crime iii the vicinity of
supermarkets and other stores recur and occasionally succeed. See, e.g., Doyle v. Exxon Corp., 592F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1979); Gomez v. Ticor, 145 Cal. App. 3d 622, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1983); Allen v.Babrab, Inc., 438 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1983); Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141(1982); Brown v. J.C. Penney Co., 64 Or. App. 293, 667 P.2d 1047, affd, 297 Or. 695, 688 P.2d
811 (1984).
249. See Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141, (1982) (landlord-tenant
principles equally applicable in commercial shopkeeper context).
250. See supra text accompanying note 53.
251. Customers do not always weigh safety against other considerations. At least for staple items
such as food, shoppers tend to patronize neighborhood markets regardless of the danger. Less wealthy
city dwellers may not even have the means of transportation to visit stores in other areas.
252. On the other hand, while supermarket customers may be unlikely or unable to change their
everyday shopping habits based on safety, patrons of evening entertainment are very likely to forgo a
visit to a dangerous cocktail lounge. Evidence concerning marketing trends, recurring criminal activity,
and previous responses to crime by the storeowners and customers might suggest liability for markets
but not for the lounges.
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gain the ear of governmental leaders.253 In the absence of liability, though,
they have little reason to seek legislative or administrative assistance in
dealing with crime. Under current tort standards, the business community
does not see itself as bearing any responsibility for controlling crime.
2
"
Negligent security liability of storeowners would thus probably have sub-
stantial attitude-changing effects.
The extent of consumer awareness and public debate concerning crime
near particular shopping areas or types of stores may, however, vary.
Where categories of enterprises are notorious for criminal activity near
their premises, resulting injuries are well publicized in the news, and
neighborhood groups have sought regulatory redress, judicial intervention
seems less warranted. Process costs militate against shifting liability where
these other means will bring about the full range of the "political effects."
4. The First Bank Case-Automatic Teller Victims
55
A bank advertises 24-hour service at its sidewalk automatic
teller machine. A customer obtains cash from the machine after
hours and is robbed. Bank officials are aware that automatic
tellers attract robbers.
Crime at automatic teller locations occurs at a staggering rate. Consum-
ers are at most generally aware that there is some danger in using those
services. They have no reason or way to know of the exceptionally high
risk.
Urban banks, in contrast, keep abreast of criminal activity at their sites.
They are familiar with the locations at which customers are likely to be
robbed while using automated teller services. Banks nonetheless encourage
use of their night-time services indiscriminately, rather than issuing warn-
253. For examples of small business lobbying activity, see SBA Amendments of 1962: Hearing on
S.2970 Before the Subcomm. on Small Business of the Sen. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1962) (letter of Theron Rice, Legislative Action General Manager, U.S. Chamber
of Commerce); Small Business Investment Act Amendments of 1962: Hearings on H.R. 799 before
the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1963) (statement of John
Gosnell, Secretary and General Counsel of National Small Business Association).
254. Cf Environmental Hearing, supra note 154, at 30, 34 (statement of Senator Henry M.
Jackson) ("When the public began to demand legislation to control pollution and to prevent environ-
mental decay, the reaction of those involved in environmental degrading activities was often one of
counter-indignation. Businessmen . . . were confronted with costs . . . that they had never before
been called upon to pay. They were now about to be penalized for behavior which America had long
accepted as normal.").
255. Judges have resisted bank responsibility. One court that recognized liability in theory by
sending a case to a jury for decision, McKinney v. First & Merchants, No. 59297 (Fairfax Cty. Va.
Cir. Ct., Feb. 10, 1984), reported in NAT'L L.J., Feb. 27, 1984, at 11, col. 1, instructed the jury,
pursuant to strict Virginia law, that any contributory negligence by plaintiff would bar compensation.
The jury entered a verdict for defendant.
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ings and providing special security at the dangerous outposts. Although
the banks are in an exclusive position to provide security, few take any
measures at all.25 The functional and normative arguments in favor of
imposing liability on banks are therefore strong.
The political justification seems to support liability as well. The dan-
gers inherent in modern banking technology reflect a new social phenome-
non that legislatures and other governmental bodies have yet to address.2 57
Since potential victims are unorganized and uninformed about the extent
of the danger and the available security measures, they are unlikely to
raise the issue in public fora. In contrast, if courts impose liability and the
resulting cost of taking crime-preventive measures proves prohibitive, the
strong banking lobby is sure to seek legislative assistance.258 Shifting lia-
bility would thus promote political debate in precisely the manner envi-
sioned by the political effects model.259
Liability and the resulting publicity should also heighten customer
awareness of the danger. This in turn will enable customers to take safety
considerations into account and, by withholding their patronage, make the
degree of their desire for security known to banks. Customers' heightened
awareness of the risk thus may well ease the legislature's ultimate task of
providing protection. These indirect effects of liability further justify im-
plementation of the model in the automatic teller case.
256. The customer can only "take or leave" the service. A bank can take a range of measures,
including issuing warnings to customers, providing cameras which may deter robbers, erecting bullet
proof security installations from which customers can telephone for assistance if a suspicious person is
lurking nearby, and hiring security guards. As a last resort, it can even shut its automated tellers
entirely.
In deciding whether to introduce automatic teller machines or provide security measures, banks
might well look to economists or operations research experts for guidance. But in Hannan & Mc-
Dowell, The Determinants of Technology Adoption: The Case of the Banking Firm, 15 RAND J.
EGON. 328 (1984), two such experts propose a model for when banks should or will in fact adopt the
new outdoor banking technology without even mentioning customer safety as a relevant factor.
257. Cf 12 C.F.R. §§ 21.0-21.7 (1985) (minimum bank security requirements). Federal regula-
tions, enforceable only by a $100 civil penalty, are tailored to manned walk-up teller windows, not
automated tellers. Id. § 21.1, 21.7, App. A at 286.
258. It is no answer to say the police should merely provide more patrols in the vicinity of banks.
See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. Even if additional public resources were available,
police protection, by its nature, must usually react to crime instead of systematically preventing it.
Thus, security measures that focus on the particular characteristics of the banking industry are needed
to control the incidence of crime at 24-hour machines.
259. Even if a legislature determines not to implement mandatory measures against automatic
teller crime, this is a context in which public debate surrounding legislative consideration may itself
have beneficial effects in educating potential victims. Potential victims, once informed of the frequency
and location of automatic teller robberies, can take steps to protect themselves.
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5. The Second Bank Case-Robbery Victims 6.
A customer walks into a bank while a robbery is in progress.
He is shot during the escape. There is a relatively high and
well-known incidence of bank robbery.
Banks may be somewhat more aware than customers of statistics con-
cerning bank robberies and resulting injuries to bystanders. Yet several
factors combine to make negligent security liability less appropriate.
With or without liability, the major expense of bank robberies would
remain the stolen bank funds.26 This potential loss provides significant
incentives on banks to take state-of-the-art security measures to prevent
robberies. 262 Banks may, of course, focus security at protecting their
money or employees, rather than customers. In the vast majority of cases,
however, holding banks responsible for personal injuries is not likely to
provoke much of a change. Most crime-deterrent, money-protective de-
vices (e.g. guards, cameras, alarms) can satisfy the negligent security lia-
bility standard of "reasonable" security measures. Except in extreme
cases, banks should thus be able to disprove negligence as a factual matter
even if a cause of action is allowed.2"3
In addition, the informational barriers that keep victims from perceiv-
ing crime risk are arguably less significant than in the automatic teller
situation. Bank robberies are well-publicized. Newspaper accounts and
motion pictures have dramatized the danger of frequenting banking prem-
ises..2 " Hence, a negligent security cause of action may not serve the re-
source allocation function of tort liability.
More significantly, the bank robbery scenario does not satisfy the first
260. A few bank robbery victims have filed lawsuits. The courts have unanimously rejected liabil-
ity. See, e.g., Berdeaux v. City Nat'l Bank of Birmingham, 424 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1982); Nigido v.
First Nat'l Bank of Baltimore, 264 Md. 702, 288 A.2d 127 (1972); Altepeter v. Virgil State Bank,
345 Ill. App. 585, 104 N.E.2d 334 (1952).
261. A victim's recovery might be as large as the proceeds of a robbery. Few robberies, however,
result in injuries. Thus the banks' primary concern, on average, should logically be the risk of losing
funds.
262. We could in theory imagine an insurance system in which banks became less concerned over
the risk of loss. The size of the potential losses, however, render this possibility remote. Insurers will
either insist on security precautions or raise the price of premiums to coincide with the increased
danger. Virtually all banks therefore see fit to adopt at least such basic protections as armed guards,
time-locked vaults, and videotaping of the premises.
263. See, e.g., Nigido v. First Nat'l Bank of Baltimore, 264 Md. 702, 705, 288 A.2d 127, 128
(1972). Of course, banks may occasionally act negligently. Legally, there is then as much justification
for courts to impose liability as to decline. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. The issue
reduces to whether the benefits of shifting liability are worth the process costs. In the absence of a
recurring type of negligence, torts political goals cannot justify liability.
264. Bank patrons can thus realistically balance the magnitude of the risk against the relatively
small likelihood a robbery will occur in their presence. Banking by mail procedures give them
alternatives.
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criterion of the political effects model. The extent of the injury in any
particular robbery may be great, but the incidence of bystander victimiza-
tion is relatively small.2"5 Bank security measures usually work. Only a
few lawsuits alleging bank negligence have been filed. The serious, recur-
ring social condition that underscores the need for tort's political impact
may therefore be absent.
A liability rule is also unlikely to have any attitude changing effect,
encourage the formation of political coalitions, or foster debate. Because
banks already have a significant stake, the incentive to seek any necessary
legislative assistance already exists.28 Victims are such a small class that
collective representation is no more likely to influence the legislature than
individual contact with their congressmen. Shifting liability would there-
fore probably have little impact in promoting new legislative solutions.
6. The Airline Hijacking Case287
An airplane is hijacked by terrorist guerrillas. The hijackerskill a passenger when authorities refuse to give in to their
demands.
The hijacking hypothetical underscores the lesson of the bank robbery
case. Courts should distinguish among varying negligent security situa-
tions because placing the burden upon defendants will not always serve
tort's substantive or political justifications.
Even more so than bank robberies, hijackings are extremely visible
events. Each occurrence makes the national news. Because of this public-
ity, potential victims know of the danger. 6" They can express their pref-
erence for "safety" by choosing other means of transportation. Since air
travel is an activity for which potential victims do consider risks and alter-
265. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that during the two year period 1978-79, approxi-
mately 12,200 bank robberies occurred throughout the entire United States and that approximately2.1% of these (i.e., 256) resulted in injuries. See Bank Robbery, BUREAU OF JUsr. STATISTICS BULL.,
Aug. 1984, at 2. The Bureau's report does not distinguish how many of the 128 cases per year
resulted in serious injury that might have merited litigation.
266. Indeed, the federal government has focused on the special problems associated with bank
robbery. See id at 1.
267. Only hijacking of domestic flights would be covered by common law principles. See, e.g.,Edwards v. National Airlines, Inc., 307 So.2d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (suit maintainable
against domestic airline for injuries proximately resulting from negligent failure to prevent hijacking),
rev'd, 336 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1976) (alleged damages too remote). Injuries resulting from international
hijacking are subject to the strict liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention. See Note, WarsawConvention-Passengers' Right of Recovery Against Airlines for Mental Anguish Suffered in Hi-jacking, 3 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAInONAL L. 452-53 (1974). But cf N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1985, at
B5, col. 2 (passenger injured in hijacking of cruise ship sues shipping line).
268. Upon entering an airport, they are reminded of the danger as soon as they proceed through
the x-ray security system.
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269
natives, the market may well already produce appropriate incentives
upon airlines to take safety precautions. If it does, the functional justifica-
tion for tort regulation disappears.
In addition, airlines are not, by themselves, in a position to prevent
most types of hijacking attempts.2 70 The political roots of the crime mean
that governments must participate in attacking it.271 Airlines share facili-
ties, so security measures must be airport-wide to be effective. Local air-
port authorities are in at least as important a position to deter hijacking as
the airlines themselves. Individual airlines are thus not the type of con-
trolling central actors2712 that incentive-producing tort doctrines ordinarily
target.
One of the reasons airlines thrive despite hijacking is that it happens
infrequently.273 Passenger injuries in the course of such a crime are even
rarer.2 7 4 While the handful of actual attempts are serious in nature when
they occur, the problem of hijacking no longer rises to epidemic propor-
tions. Thus from a political perspective also, it does not seem to call for
radical new solutions.
Moreover, hijacking, because of its political overtones, is perhaps one of
the few areas of crime-prevention in which current private attitudes and
lack of victim lobbying do not impede successful law enforcement. 2
75 Air-
lines, passengers, and governments all have an interest in avoiding further
incidents. Existing cooperative security measures have helped reduce hi-
jacking attempts to a trickle.2"' If better techniques become available, the
government and airlines seem prepared to consider every practical precau-
tion. Imposing legal responsibility upon airlines to take preventive mea-
sures is unlikely to bring about any shift in attitudes or produce any lob-
bying activity that would contribute to new solutions.
269. Arguably, potential passengers cannot competently assess the risk of flying. With the high
level of publicity given to hijacking, they may well overemphasize the danger, compared with that of
other transportation systems.
270. There are exceptions. For example, planes that have no door separating pilots from passen-
gers invite hijackers to enter the cockpit. The installation of doors is within the airline's unilateral
control.
271. In terms of compensation, international carriers are already subject to the "cooperative" solu-
tion imposed by the Warsaw Convention. Liability is strict, but the level of available compensation is
limited. See, e.g., Harari-Raful v. Trans World Airlines, 41 A.D.2d 753, 755, 341 N.Y.S.2d 655, 658
(1973).
272. See supra note 55.
273. After the initial surge in domestic-flight hijackings from 1961 to 1972, the frequency reduced
to approximately one per year. See Landes, An Economic Study of U.S. Aircraft Hijacking,
1961,,197 6 , 21 J. L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1978).
274. Indeed, it is probably fair to say that the dangers of injury from an airline accident far
outstrip the danger from a hijacking casualty.
275. Cf. Landes, supra note 273, at 4 (American government is cooperating with foreign nations
on anti-hijacking measures).
276. Id. at 2.
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C. Balancing Process versus Political Effects Costs in Negligent Secur-
ity Law
The six examples illustrate the care with which courts should approach
negligent security cases. Negligent security liability is a viable, justifiable
aspect of general tort law. Its theory, though, is enticing. Courts have
tended to adopt or reject it indiscriminately. The substantive and political
justifications for liability do not apply equally to all conceivable negligent
security situations. Only by keeping the various goals and functions of tort
law firmly in mind can courts contemplating negligent security rules avoid
creating hopeless confusion in the law.
In the period immediately following implementation of the political ef-
fects model, litigation may be marked by a measure of short term process
costs. Aspects of the model, though, mitigate the process concerns. Since
the political justification comes into play only where liability also furthers
tort's substantive goals, the model will authorize only a limited number of
new cases. In addition, any new "politically-based" liability rule by defi-
nition stems from the expectation that legislatures (1) will select alterna-
tive methods to fight crime and compensate victims, and (2) will then re-
lieve the courts of determining negligent security litigation case-by-case.
The uncertainty resulting from the rule is therefore likely to be of short
duration.
Even if the legislature refuses to act, negligent security litigation need
not be procedurally chaotic. Initially, courts will decide whether a group
of cases should proceed on a category-by-category rather than a case-by-
case basis. Subsequent judges can enforce that decision upon motions to
dismiss. Pre-trial motion practice will thus sharply curtail the instances in
which lawsuits can reach the jury stage. Since much of the process schol-
arship focuses on the uncertainty of jury decision-making, the process ar-
guments will often not even come into play.2 "
The very nature of negligent security litigation mitigates other process
concerns. Process costs vary, depending upon the complexity of the course
of conduct the court is asked to evaluate.278 The political effects model
will probably not justify negligent security liability in many cases involv-
ing highly controversial decisions by defendants. Under the model, courts
must take into account the legislature's difficulty in defining a manageable
standard of care. 7
277. See Twerski, supra note 1, at 521-26 (arguing that availability of directed verdicts under-
mines contention that uncertainty of jury decisionmaking justifies no-liability rule in product design
litigation).
278. See supra note 80; Henderson, Judicial Review, supra note 80, at 1535-39.
279. The model, for example, rejects liability in the hijacking context in part because security
decisions implicate such diverse considerations as the wishes of foreign powers, the need for uniform
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Moreover, the run-of-the-mill decision of whether or not to implement
security precautions is not particularly confusing or "polycentric."2 s It
will usually turn largely on cost considerations, rather than the degree to
which security will affect the quality or desirability of the defendant's
product or service.2 " Juries thus are likely to be able to apply the reason-
ableness standard without too much difficulty. The decision of whether a
reasonable merchant would bear the additional cost fits within the range
of their everyday experience in a way that more technical business and
scientific judgments might not.18
2
CONCLUSION
In recent years, courts have relied increasingly upon process arguments
to brake the expansion of negligence law. This Article has focused on a set
of practical considerations that is no more, but certainly no less, significant
than process concerns. I do not use political effects to justify liability in
the absence of process arguments because I question whether either pro-
cess or political reasoning are appropriate for judicial decisionmaking. I
am convinced, however, that they belong on the same plane.
Courts that emphasize the process costs of a liability rule should con-
sider its potential beneficial effects as well. A fair balance requires courts
to weigh all the countervailing practical factors, rather than isolating just
one. It may be that political factors have influenced past cases, but judges
action by unrelated airlines and airports, and the existence or desireability of national trade subsidies
for different airlines. Similarly, the model is inapplicable to bystander-rescue cases precisely because
they involve polycentric issues. The courts must take into account the personal fear of witnesses to
crime and the dangers of encouraging interference by citizens who are uncertain as to the nature of
the events that are occurring. See supra notes 61-66.
280. The types of security precautions available to commercial defendants, such as locks, warn-
ings, video surveillance, and security patrols, will usually be relatively simple concepts jurors can
understand from their everyday experience. Expert testimony may be required to explain details, but
crime prevention is not so complex a topic that experts are likely to hold undue sway over jurors'
decisions.
281. In product design cases, the decision of what safety precautions to adopt implicates not only
cost considerations but also factors related to product utility, aesthetics, and marketability. See Hen-
derson,Judicial Review, supra note 80, at 1540. In contrast, the safety of an enterprise's premises is
usually intertwined only to a limited exteent with its ability to offer services. The danger a crime-
prevention system protects against is ordinarily extrinsic to the business itself.
There are, of course, exceptions. Even routine security devices such as locks and doormen may
complicate the transaction of business. They may, for example, make entry of visitors into a building
more difficult. From a marketing perspective, however, this type of "complication" is a safety feature
that may enhance rather than decrease the desireability of doing business with the defendant. The key
issues for the defendant considering higher security will usually be "how much does it cost" and "is it
really worth it," not "how much will it detract from my product." The factors that impact on those
issues are likely to be limited in number.
282. The concern that a jury will act emotionally against wealthy defendants remains forceful.
That danger, however, is inherent in a jury system and is no more serious in the negligent security
than in the traditional accident litigation involving commercial defendants that process scholars would
leave in juries' hands.
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have simply not admitted it for fear of opening a "Pandora's Box." This
Article provides a framework for taking politics into account expressly, in
a delineated category of cases, and in a principled way. Using the model
to offset political effects against process costs is consistent with the adjudi-
catory role that courts have traditionally played. Most importantly, bal-
ancing politics against process may spur solutions to critical social
problems not currently being addressed.

